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AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF VARIOUS
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AS MEASURED BY INFLATION AND GROWTH
CHAPTER I 
Introduction
A comparative analysis of economic systems . . .  is 
characterized by its special viewpoint, derived from 
its task to point out the differences of the various 
systems in structure, operation, and achievement and  ̂
to be applied to much of the total area of economics.
As Carl Landauer contends, the comparison of economic 
systems is the only effective way to measure and judge the 
efficiency of a particular system. The comparative method, 
however, is not without its weaknesses. "Efficiency" can 
only be measured in the attainment of similar goals, and the 
comparative method very readily illuminates the differences 
in the goals of the various economic systems. Differences 
in goals are also present between various countries employ­
ing the same economic system. Even when the goals are the 
same, the priority placed on the goals may differ. One also 
has problems in measuring the attainment of goals when this 
achievement cannot be stated in quantifiable terms. For
Carl Landauer, "Significance of Comparative Analysis 
of Economic Systems," Neue Perspektiven aus Wirtschaft und 
Recht; Festschrift fur Hans Schaffer, ed. by Carsten Peter 
Claussen (Berlin; Duncker & Humblot, 1956), p. 79.
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example, how would one measure how effectively a particular 
system meets the goal of "freedom"? The achievement of this 
goal is not quantifiable, but one can state the relative 
freedom of one system to another.
In the process of measuring the economic performance, 
one can make use of the economic indicators which can be 
expressed in numerical terms giving an indication of real 
growth rates and inflation. The process of determining 
economic performance for particular countries has been 
employed for some time, and the techniques used to gather 
the necessary data have been greatly improved. The addition 
of the comparative concept should provide useful new dimen­
sions in the measurement of economic performance of the 
basic economic systems.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is threefold. The first 
is to develop a methodology with which to approach the study 
of comparative economic systems. There is not general 
agreement among economists regarding which method is most 
effective in the comparison of systems. Especially in the 
comparison of economic performance, one must derive a method 
that is both realistic and applicable in existing systems.
The various "pure theory" methods will be compared to the 
methodology developed by Spiethoff and Max Weber. The 
methodology derived from Weber and Spiethoff will be defended
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as being both a theoretical and a realistic approach to the 
study of economic systems.
The second major purpose of the study is to attempt 
to describe the basic economic systems present in the world 
since World War II. Economic systems are continually 
changing and evolving, and the study of existing systems 
proves useful in developing the essential features of the 
various systems. The portion of the study devoted to this 
purpose will compare the existing forms of communism, 
capitalism, socialism, and traditionalism to the classical 
definitions and concepts of the systems. In addition the 
different forms of systems are present as sub-systems, and 
some of these sub-systems will be described.
Finally, the primary purpose of the study is to 
examine the economic performance evidenced by the economic 
systems in the last two decades. Representative countries 
will be selected for the basic systems, and the economic 
performance of the economies will be used as an indication 
of the performance of their respective economic systems. 
Quantitative measures will be applied to the various indi­
cators of growth and stability, and these indicators will 
be compared within and between the economic systems of 
capitalism, socialism, communism, and traditionalism.
Hypotheses to be Tested 
The two following hypotheses will be tested statis­
tically in this study:
1. The performance of the various national economies 
within the same economic system is not statis­
tically different from one another,
2. The economic performance of the different systems 
as indicated by the national economies is not 
statistically different.
The basic idea represented by the above hypotheses is that
the economic system is of basic importance in the economic
performance of an economy. If this is true, then it is
reasonable to predict that the performance of the economies
within the same system should be the same. Also, the
different systems should result in differing performances.
The assumption is made that one goal common to all economic
systems is good economic performance in the areas of real
growth and price stability.
Scope of the Study 
The time period included in the statistical testing 
of the hypotheses will be the post World War II period of 
the years 1950 through and including 1967. These two decades 
were chosen because of the availability of the data and 
because there is not the large disruption of a world war.
In many cases even in these two decades, data is not readily
\available for the countries included in the study; ■ The • 
decade of 1958-1967 provides the largest amount of data and 
will be used separately when data on other years is insuf­
ficient. Although the economic systems in some countries 
went through major changes, most countries experienced only 
evolutionary changes in economic organization. Twenty years.
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provide a time period of sufficient length to indicate basic 
differences between the economic systems without allowing 
for too many major changes in the systems which would make 
the study less meaningful.
The performance indicators which will be used to 
measure economic progress of the economies are divided into 
two major groups. The first group consists of measures of 
real economic growth rates. The increase of per capita 
Gross National Product should give the best overall picture 
of economic growth, but others will be used to supplement 
this primary indicator. Real per capita growth rates will 
be compared for National Income, Private Consumption, Gross 
Domestic Product, and Gross Fixed Capital formation when 
data is available. The ratio of Gross Domestic Fixed 
Capital to Gross Domestic Product will be employed to measure 
the emphasis on econotaic development, and the ratio of 
Private Consumption to Gross Domestic Product will be used 
to indicate some differences in the various economic systems.
The second major type of performance-indicator is 
used to show the price stability of the economic systems.
The primary indicator used is the price index. Not only will 
the rates of inflation play an important role, but the change 
in rates of inflation should contribute to the stability 
measurement. Since price stability and growth are goals 
found in most economic systems, these two types of indicators 
appear to be the most useful in the comparison of different
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systems. Also, the achievement of these goals can be more 
easily quantified than other social or economic goals which 
a system might have.
Not all countries in the world will be used in the 
statistical study, but an effort will be made to provide 
data from countries which are most representative of their 
respective economic systems. Certain criteria will be used 
in the selection of a country for inclusion in the study. 
First, data must be available to provide the performance 
indicators as described above. Secondly, the country's 
economic system must be representative of that basic form 
of economic system. Thirdly, the economic system must have 
remained relatively constant over the twenty-year period 
included in the study. Finally, the assumption of economic 
growth as a goal must be valid for the country.
The four basic systems of mixed capitalism, demo­
cratic socialism, traditionalism, and communism will be the 
economic systems which will be compared in the study.
Although each of the above can be broken down into sub­
systems and sub-sub-systems, the major classifications are 
those most widely accepted in the literature of comparative 
economic systems. Also, the four systems are those suggested 
by the use of economic Gestalt methods and the typification 
process described in chapter II.
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Limitations of the. Study
In judging the economic performance of the economic
systems, one must measure the performance in terms of common
goals. In this case the assumption is made that economic
growth and stability are goals common to each of the economic
systems.. Although the validity of the assumption appears
certain since all economic systems are built around the idea
of providing the satisfaction of human wants, the corollary
assumption of equal priority of these goals is less tenable.
Our comparison of performance can achieve only two 
things: It can point out where each system excels
the other in meeting certain goals, and it may 
suggest the extent to which.one purpose is sacri­
ficed for another; it may also enable us to decide 
that we prefer one particular system, because we 
support the goal which it approaches more closely 
than do the other systems.^
The results of this study should indicate the effectiveness
of the economic systems in obtaining these economic goals
and may indicate the priority of the performance goals in
the respective systems.
The greatest limitation of a study of this type
centers around the data which must be used to measure the
economic performance of the various countries. The most
■ 1 ' obvious problem is the lack of data for certain countries
or time periods. In the selection of the countries one of
the criteria used was the availability of data so most of
the cpuntries will have a large portion of the data that
2Landauer, "Significance of Comparative Analysis, "
p. 7.
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will be needed for this time period. Since the study is 
primarily concerned with average rates of growth, unavail­
able data would not necessarily change the results signifi­
cantly. The validity of the data which is available will 
also be challenged. United Nations data will be used for 
most of the countries in the free world while special 
studies will be used for the data of the communist countries. 
Although the data may be subject to question, one must use 
the best data available for the type of research this paper 
is providing.
The research is designed to test the stated hypo­
theses and cannot effectively determine all of the factors 
responsible for the differences in performance of the dif- . 
feréht systems. The resource mix will not be the same for 
each of the countries included, but a portion of this problem 
can be eliminated by using per capita data when available. 
Also, by including several countries for each system the 
resource mix between the economic systems will be more 
comparable than between individual countries. Differences 
in the amount of accumulated capital will be considered in 
an effort to isolate the effects of these variations. , \
Organization
The methodology utilized in the study and classifi­
cation of the various economic systems is developed in 
Chapter II. Using this methodology a study of the basic 
systems will be presented in the next two chapters. Both
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the classical and modern systems will he outlined as ideal 
and real type models with primary attention being given to 
the institutions and goals. Chapter III examines the 
democratic systems of capitalism and socialism, and 
Chapter IV describes communism and traditionalism. The 
presentation of the prototypes and preliminary analysis of 
the hypotheses are presented in Chapter V. The presentation 
of the data and results of the statistical work constitute 
Chapter VI. The conclusions will be discussed in Chapter VII.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
Introduction
In approaching the problem of what type of metho­
dology should be used in the classification of economic 
systems, one must first examine what an economic system is.
A representative definition of an economic system is pro­
vided by Carl Landauer.
An economic system may be defined as the sum total 
of the devices by which the preferences among 
alternative purposes of economic activities are 
coordinated for the achievement of these purposes.
The central problem of any economic system is the 
allocation of resources.^
Underlying all economic systems one finds the usual 
economic problem of the "scarcity of goods and unlimited 
human wants." The economic system must provide a method 
for the production and the allocation of the goods and 
services. The definition given by Landauer, however, speaks 
of "the sum total of devices" which includes noneconomic, 
as well as economic, devices having an influence on economic
Carl Landauer, "Significance of Comparative Analysis 
of Economic Systems," Neue Perspektiven aus Wirtschaft und 
Rect Festschrift fur Hans Schaffer, ed. by Carsten Peter 
Claussen (Berlin: Buncker & Humblot, 1956), p. 80.
10
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actions and alternatives. Every economic system works 
within a framework of the social, political, and legal 
systems of the society, but it is often studied simply as a 
separate entity. Should one confine the study of compara­
tive economic systems to the pure economic actions, actors, 
and results, or should the other influences be part of the 
methodology of dealing with this study? An approach which 
will aerve the present study more effectively is to con­
sider the economic system as a system established by a 
controlling group, animated by a definite spirit and regu­
lated by a specific organization which is applying a specific 
technical knowledge leading to a definite production.
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the 
various forms of pure theory methodology and to compare 
the use of pure theory to economic Gestalt theory. Four 
different methods of pure theory ennumerated by Arthur 
Schweitzer are discussed as they are used in the study of 
comparative economic systems. Spiethoffs economic Gestalt 
theory is presented as a possible alternative to the pure 
theory approach. In the application of Gestalt theory to 
a comparison of economic systems, classification criteria 
are suggested to provide a framework for researching and 
classifying national economies.
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Comparison of Two Methods
Pure Theory Approach 
"Pure theory emphasizes the isolation of specific 
phenomena and the relations which may exist are disregarded. 
In pure economic theory one is primarily interested in the 
examination of uniformities which can be detected, measured 
and explained. The study of economic systems provides an 
opportunity to measure the uniformities of various economic 
systems and the countries within the systems. Uniformities 
are also present throughout a span of time. "Pure theory 
starts from data which have an axiomatic character, and 
conclusions are reached by a process of logical deduction: 
the student draws conclusions about effects by taking given
3data as causes." Pure theory provides an objective method 
with which to examine the economic data of the various 
economic systems.
Professor Schweitzer presents four methods which 
have been suggested as providing the necessary link between 
pure economic theory and the study of comparative economic 
systems.^ The first approach is the National Economic
^Arthur Spiethoff, "Pure Theory and Economic Gestalt 
Theory; Ideal Types and Real Types," Enterprise and Secular 
Change: Readings in Economic History, ed. for the American
Economic Association and the Economic History Association 
by Frederic C. Lane and Jelle C. Riemersma (Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1953), p. 445.
^Ibid., p. 445.
^Arthur Schweitzer, "Approaches to Comparative 
Economics," A paper presented at the Southern Economic
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Approach in Which there is a homogeneity of goals and 
activities toward-production and consumption. The differ­
ences between the various national economies are caused 
by only two agents, nature and the political powers.
"Since foreign trade is expected to minimize the differences, 
originated by nature, the primary cause for persistent 
economic differences is thus attributed to political diver­
sity among nations."^ The study of comparative economics 
in the National Economic Approach would appear to be more 
political than economic in scope, and one begins to feel as 
if he should study political science in preparation for 
the study of comparative economic systems. Because of the 
assumption of pure competition, one cannot avoid the deter­
mining assumption of the homogeneity of economic goals and 
activities of production and consumption.
In the second pure method, the ideal axioms of 
modern welfare theory have been applied to all actual 
economies in the Axiomatic Approach. In the traditional 
manner the axioms are applied to the economies of the "free" 
national economies to measure the efficiency with which the 
resources are used in the production process. Even in the 
"most ruthless dictatorships" the followers“of this approach 
have found a method to use the axioms to measure, not
Association, November 13, 1964, p. 2. See also the appendix 
to Schweitzer's Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1964).
3Ibid., p. 3.
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efficiency/ but inefficiencies. For example, in the Soviet 
Union prices based on standards of cost are determined.
After an adjustment has been made for the turnover tax'and 
any subsidies, the "cost" price is compared to the actual 
price to measure the inefficiency the government has expe­
rienced. Goals of the different economies are not used as 
a possible explanation for the "indicated inefficiency," 
Comparative economics using this approach is reduced to a 
welfare approach to measuring comparative efficiencies.
Realizing that economic systems are generally mix­
tures of two or more various economic systems, some 
Keynesians have extended the use of macro-theory to study 
these "mixed" systems. The Dualist Approach establishes 
two sectors in each economy. The capitalist sector is com­
posed of the private sector, and the activities of all 
governments are included in the socialist sector. The 
hypothesis is that the lack of aggregate demand in the 
capitalist sector is directly responsible for the growth 
of the socialist sector of the economy. All types of govern­
ment activity are treated homogeneously in the socialist 
sector, and the reasons for growth of the sector are attri­
buted to the lack of aggregate demand in the private sector. 
Using this framework, one can easily see the increasing size 
of the socialist sectors in many of the world's national 
economies. The causal effect is, however, one of hypothesis 
rather than of world reality.
15
The final method discussed by Schweitzer as being 
used in the area of pure theory is the Command Approach.
This analytical framework is designed for the analysis of 
the command economies where an artificial method of alloca­
tion of resources is established in place of the market 
system. The basic assumption of the Command Approach centers 
on the efficiency of the market, system in the allocation of 
resources. By establishing a command system, the rulers 
have built in a large amount of waste which would not be 
found in the market system, "Neoclassical theory is assigned 
the dual role of providing a direct explanation of the market 
economy, and of explaining the wastage of the command 
economy."® Since the two different types of economies are 
examined with one type of theory (and that theory designed 
for market economies), apparent waste is produced in the 
command economy. The basic assumption that all economies 
are governed by neo-classical principles limits the effec­
tiveness of the use of the Command Approach, especially in 
comparing such diverse systems as Soviet Communism and United 
States Capitalism.
Certainly one could come up with several other methods 
in which pure theory could be linked to the study of economic 
systems, but these four seem to be representative of the 
application of pure theory. As is evident in the discussion 
of the approaches above, there appear several limitations in
®Ibid., p. 6.
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the use of pure theory to describe actual economies. The 
interest of the pure theorist in extracting uniformities is 
the most hampering of the limitations. Comparative economic 
systems studies examine a heterogeneous set of economic 
actions. The treatment of all systems as like elements 
removes the study from actual economies to models of eco­
nomic relationships in the mind of the theorist. One is 
interested in the common elements of the different systems 
Which produce uniformities, but the singularities often 
provide the analyst with the more realistic answers to the 
questions under study.
Since all economic systems operate in a world of 
political, social, and psychological forces, one finds that 
often economic results cannot be attributed to economic 
causes. Max Weber suggested that man is motivated by various 
levels of goals. The economic interest goals give rise to 
a rational action designed for material gain. If this were 
the only goal type, economic theory would be sufficient to 
analyse economic systems. Man, however, is motivated by 
belief goals, traditional goals, and emotional goals which
7introduce economic irrationality. In these cases the 
economist must leave the area of pure theory for the explana­
tion of the economic organization. If we can agree with 
Spiethoff that the "foremost and principal task of scholars
7Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization (New York; Free Press, 1954), p. 127.
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is the search for causes,the limitation of pure economic 
theory becomes self-evident because the causes of different 
economic actions are often explained by noneconomic 
phenomena.
One final limitation of the use of pure economic
theory is apparent. " . . .  a number of different economic
theories have been developed? there exists not just one
theory. A wide range of theories, from Smith to Keynes
and Schumpeter, shows the fecundity of the deductive 
gimagination." The different theories provide many ways 
of treating the problems, but none of them can handle the 
totality required in the study of economic systems.
Since the comparison of economic systems involves 
both singularities and uniformities, the method of pure 
economic theory must be used for the extraction of the uni­
formities, but cannot be used effectively as a method to 
explain the totality including the singularities.
Economic Typification Theoiry 
To develop a working methodology which could be 
used as a theory to explain the uniformities of the economic
8 '■ Arthur Spiethoff, "Pure Theory," p. 449.
^Frederic C. Lane and Jelle C. Riemersma, "Intro­
duction to Spiethoff," Enterprise and Secular Change; 
Readings in Economic History, ed. for the American Economic 
Association and the Economic History Association (Homewood: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1953), p. 431.
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style and to remain true to reality, Arthur Spiethoff
constructed a framework of economic Gestalt theory.
This theory aims at the closest possible approxi­
mation to observable reality. It goes without 
saying that economic Gestalt theory cannot deal 
with reality as a whole. In that case it would 
lose sight of the uniformities, being confronted 
with the overwhelming multitude of historical 
singularities and their interrelations';. It would 
cease to be theory.H 1
The effort is to obtain the essential features of the phe­
nomena being studied without letting the irregular and 
inessential features make the study impossible. In this 
manner reality may be expressed in terms of uniformities and 
the primary singularities. This is done without abstracting 
the essential singularities out of the explanation as is 
done with pure theory. \
Although very similar to the Spiethoff methodology. 
Max Weber's typification process better serves the function 
of understanding economic systems. The ability to logically 
combine theory and reality is present in both Weber's typifi­
cation method and Spiethoff s Gestalt theory, but the typifi­
cation process more correctly emphasizes the goals or motives 
animating economic actions. The understanding of the motives 
behind the event or phenomena is basic to the idea of the 
German concept of Verstehen, and this idea goes beyond the
Fritz Redlich, the translator, felt the term 
economic Gestalt theory was the best translation of 
aunschauliche Theorie because the method of Spiethoff aimed 
at explaining the totality of the phenomena.
^^Arthur Spiethoff, "Pure Theory," p. 445.
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simple explanation of the causes as is done in the pure
theory methodology. "Motivational causality . . .  implies
causal imputation: economic activities are seen as the
result of or caused by certain motives. The word 'motive'
means the totality of mental activities behind human
a c t i o n . "12 collingwood ej^resses Verstehen as thinking as
the actor. The Social Scientist
. . , investigating any event in the past, makes 
a distinction between what may be called the 
outside and the inside of an event .. . .In the 
case of nature, this distinction does not arise.
The events of nature are mere events, not the acts 
of agents whose thought the scientist endeavors 
to trace . . . the events of history are never 
mere phenomena, never mere spectacles for contempla­
tion, but things which the historian looks, not at, 
but through, to discern the thought within them.
In thus penetrating to the inside of events and 
detecting the thought which they express, the 
historian is doing something which the scientist 
need not and cannot do . . . For history, the object 
to be discovered is not the mere event, but the 
thought expressed in it. To discover the thought 
is already to understand it. The cause of the 
event for him, means the thought in the mind of the 
person by whose agency the event came about: and
this is not something other than the event, it is 
inside the event itself.
But how does the historian discern the thoughts 
which he is trying to discover? There is only one 
way in which it can be done: By re-thinking them
in his own mind. The historian of philosophy, 
reading Plato, is trying to know what Plato thought 
when he expressed himself in certain words. .The 
only way in which he can do this is by thinking I
it for himself. This, in fact, is what we mean 
when we speak of "understanding" the words. So 
the historian of politics or warfare, presented 
with an account of certain actions done by Caesar, 
tries to understand these actions, that is, to 
discover what thoughts in Caesar's mind determined 
him to do them. This implies envisaging for himself
l^Ibid., p. 449.
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the situation in which Caesar stood/ and thinking 
for himself what Caesar thought about the situation 
and the possible ways of dealing with it. The 
history of thought, and therefore all history, 
is the re-enactment of past thought in the 
historian's own mind.i^
Weber speaks of the relationship of economic moti­
vation and the resulting economic action.
Action will be said to be "economically oriented" so 
far as, according to its subjective meaning, it is 
concerned with the satisfaction of a desire for 
"utilities" (Nutzleistunqen). "Economic action"
(Wirtschaften) is a peaceful use of the actor's 
control over resources, which is primarily eco­nomically o r i e n t e d . 14
Rationality is introduced through rational motivation to 
economic means. Actions which are economically oriented 
may include activities that are not generally considered as 
economic. For example, political actions, including wars, 
often serve economic means and are based on economic goals. 
Technology is generally economically oriented with the 
economic action determining the ends and technology providing 
the means. Goals are evidenced through economic orientation 
which in turn produces economic actions.
In the comparison of economic systems, the motiva­
tional causes are examined in terms of "goals," as will be 
explained below. The inductive framework provides the 
structure, but the explanation of the motives is the
G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 214-15.
4̂jMax Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 158.
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investigation of the spirit of the system. For example# 
one would find it impossible to "understand" the economic 
system of pre-war Germany without knowing the motives# or 
"goals#" behind the various power blocks.
Historians try to break down the uniformities and 
generalities of the economic styles and systems#but 
the typification method investigates real situations# 
distills the significant features# and highlights the 
generalities without losing the features necessary to define 
the system. To use the typification method one has to 
examine the totality of the economic system. Each of the 
parts (social# economic# political# etc.) is studied# but 
one must recognize the importance of researching the rela­
tionships of the parts to each other and to the total system.
The concept of economic style is not built for the 
use of (positivistic) historians who wish to 
picture the events of economic, history in their 
uniqueness. On the other hand# it is not a con­
struct like the deliberately unrealistic models 
of pure theory. A real type reflects a specific 
pattern of economic life and embodies its essential 
properties.
The advantages of the use of the typification theory 
in economic systems are evident. The methodology outlined 
by Weber provides a usable approach which can work with 
the generalities, but it also allows for different conditions
5gee Louis Gottschalk# "Categories of Historigraph- 
ical Generalization," Generalization in the Writing of History 
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press# 1963)# pp. 113-30.
^^Arthur Spiethoff# "Pure Theory," p. 457.
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surrounding the economic systems. Instead of working with 
theoretical systems which have never existed/ the uniform­
ities of current or past systems are researched.
Most of the writers consulted agree or imply that 
the actually existing economic systems constitute 
the core of comparative economics. The aim is not 
to deal with the pure or closed economy, or to 
build hypothetical thought models, but to ascertain 
and interpret the central characteristics of actual 
economies.17
In an effort to use the concept of economic typifi­
cation in the area of economic systems, one must distill 
the essential features of the economic system from the non- 
essential singularities. Studying all of the events and 
features of a particular system in its totality is not of 
use in the comparative analysis. One must rely on a frame­
work of the essential features which can be compared to the 
essential features of another system. The typological method 
provides a tool for the distillation process in the selection 
of the core features used in the comparison. Two approaches 
are used for typification. The first approach constructs 
the essential features of an economic system around intended 
actions with an assumption of rational economic behavior on 
the part of the economic actors. The second involves thp 
study of a particular economy at a particular time period 
and selecting the features necessary to represent the eco­
nomic style or system. Although the underlying assumptions
17Arthur Schweitzer, "The Scope of Comparative 
Economics," A paper presented to the Association for Compara­
tive Economics, December 30, 1954.
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of the two methods differ, both prove useful to the compari­
son of economic systems, and the two are not necessarily in 
conflict with one another. Used correctly the two approaches 
complement each other.
Max Weber begins the typification process with the 
rationality that "for the purposes of a typological scien­
tific analysis it is convenient to treat all irrational, 
affectually determined elements of behavior as factors of
18deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action."
The ideal type constructed by Weber is a theoretical model
which assumes perfect rationality of the part of the actors.
The assumption of rationality negates the possibility of
describing real world economic systems, but a purely formal
system is built which is somewhat analogous to the models
built in the study of natural sciences.
This conceptual pattern brings together certain 
relationships and events of historical life into 
a complex, which is conceived as an internally 
consistant system. Substantively, this construct 
in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived 
at by the analytical accentuation of certain 
elements of reality.19
Instead of being a representation of reality, the ideal type
is used as a model which can be utilized as a comparison of
reality. The term "ideal" does not imply any perfection
18Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 92.
^^Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, 
translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Pinch 
(New York: The Free Press, 1949), p. 90.
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other than one of logic, and the ideal type is not a goal 
to achieve but a standard to be used as a measuring rod 
from which deviations are measured. Altl\ough the ideal 
types are not found in the real world, the comparative 
economists enhance their understanding of real world phe­
nomena through the utilization of them. !
The second approach is not "simply!derived from
experience, but is predicated on intimate knowledge of
economic reality. Its aim is to mirror economic life as a
specific set of economic institutions, economic life in its 
20concreteness." Spiethoff uses the real type as a typo­
logical approach to economic typification theory, and he 
shows how real types are derived from the application of 
typification theory to economic history. The real types of 
Spiethoff are essentially the same as Weber's prototypes 
derived from the cultural history of the economy. Because 
the construct so defined is derived from past or existing 
economic systems, the model is an historical one rather than 
theoretical and must be characteristic of an actual economic 
system. Recurrency is the basic criterion employed by Weber 
in the selection of which features of the economic system 
are essential and which are nonessential or accidental 
features.
An inherent concept in using real types is that of 
motivational causality. The motivational relationships
90Arthur Spiethoff, "Pure Theory," p. 452.
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between the economic actors are researched, and the standard
of rationality is not assumed.
The specific characteristics selected for the 
determination of a style model of type. 1 (real 
type) serve the function of elucidating why 
that specific pattern of economic life came 
into existence and persists; they are meant to 
explain causally the work of a concrete pattern 
of economic, life.^
Professor Schweitzer views the noneconomic factors as
integral parts of the study of economic systems and
essential to the typification methodology of Weber.
Persistent noneconomic factors that penetrate 
into systems will be counted among the variables 
of the theory. The major goals of the most 
influential groups have to be regarded as the 
strategic independent variables, while the specific 
institutionalizations of these goals will be most 
significant dependent v a r i a b l e s . 22
The first step in Weber's typification method is an 
historical investigation which illuminates the core features 
of the economic system. The criteria used to select the 
core features from the historical evidence are recurrency 
and essence. If the feature cannot be removed from the 
typification without changing the model, the feature should 
be considered as a "core" feature essential to the model. 
Core features are suggested by a recurring presence within
I ■the investigation. A model derived through typification may 
be used to study the evolution of an economic system, and a
^^Arthur Speithoff, "Pure Theory," p. 458.
22Arthur Schweitzer, "Typological Method in Economics: 
Max Weber's Contribution," History of Political Economy, 
Volume 2, No. 1 (Spring 1970), p. 74.
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dynamic characteristic is provided through this "comparative 
statics" technique. In the present study typification is 
used to compare different systems in the same time period.
In the study of economic systems, both the real type 
and the ideal type may be used. One must recognize that 
one cannot speak simply of systems, but must see the levels 
of systems and sub-systems represented. At the highest 
level of abstraction, one finds four or five basic systems. 
Each of these is, or has been in the past, represented by 
several sub-systems. The process of sub-dividing systems 
continues until the national economy is reached. Even at 
this level it is necessary to note that more than one 
economic system may be represented in a country. For example, 
one could define a capitalistic sector as well as a tradi­
tional sector in many of the Latin American countries. At 
the higher levels of abstraction one finds more pure theory 
helpful, but the use of typification theory is necessary 
to keep the analysis from being void of reality. At the 
lower levels of abstraction, one finds that a system more 
representative of reality can be constructed. In the 
selection of the core features necessary to define either 
the real or the ideal types, one can use classification 
criteria to guide the research for the core features. The 
classification criteria used in the classification of systems 
point up the significant features which are common to all 
systems, and the variations of these elements create the
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various classification schemes known in the traditional 
comparative economic systems:literature.
Typification Methods 
Recognizing the need for criteria in the classi­
fication of economic systems;; one should be cognizant of 
the various types of classification schemes that have tra­
ditionally been used. Henry M. Oliver, Jr. has surveyed 
the various methods in an article in which he "looks at 
the classificatory criteria, classificatory frameworks, and
classifications employed by eight recent books on economic 
23systems,"
Oliver claims that the most basic of all classifi­
cation schemes is illustrated in Economics of the World 
Today in which all of the economies are divided into 
"market" and "command" economies. Although other differences 
in economies are noted, the one basic criteria of the allo­
cation of resources is used to identify the economic system. 
Lynn Turgeon uses a similar approach as he divides the 
economies into "noncapitalist-oriented" and "capitalist- 
oriented," using the Soviet Union and the United States as
23 ( 'Henry M. Oliver, "The Concept and the Classifica­
tion of Economic Systems," Economic Systems and Public‘ 
Policy; Essays in Honor of Calvin Bryce Hoover, ed. by 
Robert S. Smith and Frank T. deVyver (Durham; Duke 
University Press, 1966), p. 37.
^^Clair Wilcox, Willis D. Weatherford, Jr., and 
Holland Hunter, Economics of the World Today (New York; 
Randam House, 1962).
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the basic prototypes of each system. Other countries with 
their mixed systems are clustered around one or the other 
of these two. Manuel Gottlieb feels that the simplicity 
of this type of classification scheme renders the analysis 
useless.
Perhaps the sin of monism is the most-heinous.
The sin takes effect in defining an economic 
system with reference only to one or two key 
features and assuming that structurally signifi­
cant variation in other features does not occur 
or is marginal and random in import.25
Morris Bornstein in Comparative Economic Systems;
Models ahd Cases adds property to the criteria of the
market while Wiles elaborates on these two in The Political
Economy of C o m m u n i s m .27 Landauer uses the building blocks
of market, property, solidarity, and tradition in Contem-
28porary Economic Systems; A Comparative Analysis. The
29classification system of Marshall Goldman builds on the 
ideas of Landauer by the addition of goals and institutional
25Manual Gottlieb, "The Theory of an Economic 
System," American Economic Review/Supplement, XLIII (May,
1953), p. 350.
2^Morris Bornstein, ed., Comparative Economic 
Systems; Models and Cases (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1965). ' •
27P. J. D. Wiles, The Political Economy of Communism 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962).
2®Carl Landauer, Contemporary Economic Systems: A
Comparative Analysis (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott
Company, 1964).
2QMarshall Goldman, ed., Comparative Economic 
Systems: A Reader (New York: Random House, 1964).
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arrangements. In Economie Systems; A Comparative
Analysis# George Halm also emphasizes the role of goals.
The last book on the list# Arthur Schweitzer's ,
Big Business and the Third Reich#differs 
considerably from the others in that it strongly 
reflects the influence of Max Weber* s method of 
classification and argues for "deliberate 
linkage" of economics with sociology and political 
science.
In his classification scheme, power and goals play a central 
role. Even in the study which is limited to a short period 
in history, Schweitzer enumerates several types of capitalism 
and fascism. Most of the variations in the systems are 
differences in goals and the power structure of the major 
groups rather than in the property structure and the alloca­
tion mechanism. The methodology of Schweitzer more closely 
appr'oaches- economic typification theory than any of the 
others as he researches not only the economic data# but the 
social and political environment as well. As the theory is 
presented it is checked for validity with the history of 
the period.
For our purpose the different criteria used by 
Schweitzer most completely demonstrate the criteria needed 
for tlje study of comparative economic systems using the ^
^^George Halm, Economic Systems: A Comparative
Analysis (New York; Rinehart, 1958).
^^Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third 
Reich. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press#
1954) '.
O  O  1Henry M. Oliver, "The Concept and classification 
of Economic Systems#" p. 48.
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typification methodology. The usual criteria of market and 
property structure are necessary/ especially in pointing up 
the uniformities. The singularities are more often estab­
lished in the examination of the financial structure/ power 
groups, labor force organization, and the goals most preva­
lent in society. The latter criteria includes the overall 
ideology of the political systems with power.
Conclusion
The general agreement of the various economists 
working in the area of comparative economic analysis is that 
the research should concentrate around actual economic 
systems of the past or existing systems. The use of the 
pure economic methodology presents many limitations because 
all economic systems must operate in a framework of social 
and political forces. Max Weber's economic typification 
theory provides an appropriate substitute for pure economic 
theory without surrendering the concept of a theoretical 
treatment. The theory of the typification methodology is 
tested by a continuing comparison to reality. The uniformi­
ties are not lost, but the research is given a deeper impor-
1 \ tance by the study of the essential singularities necessary
to describe and explain the economic style. A process of
typification can be used effectively to establish the
essential features of the system.
CHAPTER III 
DEMOCRATIC ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
Introduction
A complete description of the basic economic systems 
of either the ideal or real type is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but it is necessary to delineate among the four 
basic systems of which the study is made. The present 
chapter discusses the "ends and means," or goals and insti­
tutions, of the two economic systems which were in the ideal 
or classical sense, and are in the modern economies, con­
structed within a democratic form of government utilizing 
a "free market system" for the distribution of goods to the 
consumer. The two systems discussed below are capitalism 
and democratic socialism.
In the case of both capitalism and socialism, one 
necessarily must describe both the ideal and the real 
prototypes system since the blueprints of the classical 
systems (the ideal types) have had significant alterations 
in the implementation of the modern economic systems. John 
Kenneth Galbraith commented on the degree of change in the 
capitalist economic system.
By the early decades of the present century 
the task of constructing this model of a capitalist
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society regulated by competition was virtually 
complete. It was an intellectual achievement 
of a high order . . .  Few of the original archi­
tects of the competitive model would have 
defended it as a description of the world as it 
is— or was.^
The methodology constructed in the preceding chapter 
is used to illustrate the models. First the goals of the 
system are determined to guide in.-the description of the 
means of achieving success. The primary institutions and 
the interrelationship of the institutions are described as 
they pertain to the "ends" or goals of the system. One 
learns that more discrepancy is often noticed between the 
classical and modern concepts of the institutions than in 
the corresponding goals.
Classical Capitalism— The Ideal Type
Capitalism, in the classical sense, is a system of 
private property in producer and consumer goods, 
freedom of contract and perfect competition, with 
government intervention in economic affairs 
restricted essentially to the protection of pro­
perty, enforcement of contracts and the prevention 
of fraud.2
The world of Adam Smith has never been recorded in history, 
and the "invisible hand" has eternally been aided by a 
"visible hand" of some form of government intervention.
paradoxically the spirit of the "new system" 
devised by Adam smith to return the greatest benefits to
^John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism 
(Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955), p. 16.
^Carl Landauer, Contemporary Economic Systems 
(New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 3.
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society was based on love of self. The new breed of
capitalist entrepreneur was to meet the needs of others
by trying to fulfill his own selfish desires.
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to 
their self-love, and never talk to them of our own 
necessities but of their advantage.̂
The drive of individuals and their individual economic
growth was justified from a moral and religious background
by Luther and Calvin as described by Max Weber in The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
The spirit or moving force in Smith's laissez
faire capitalism shifts the suspicion of evil from the
individual to the government. "Smith could see in his own
\ • ’
lifetime that the 'public virtues' of rulers were far more 
wicked in their effects on society than the 'private vices' 
of either producers or consumers.The elevation of the 
individual consumer and producer was an important contribu­
tion of Smith's scheme. The profit was given the role as 
the prime economic motivator of man, and through his search 
for profit motivated by self-love, man makes his contribu­
tion tb society. ^
From the standpoint of the economic analyst, the 
chief merit of the classics consists in their
^Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, I (New York; 
Duttori, 1964), p. 13.
^John Chamberlain, The Roots of Capitalism 
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959), p. 19.
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dispelling, along with many other gross errors, 
the naive idea that economic activity in capitalist 
society, because it turns on the profit motive, 
must by virtue of that fact alone necessarily run 
counter to the interests of consumers; or, to put 
it differently, that money making necessarily 
deflects producing from its social goal; or finally, 
that private profits, both in themselves and through 
the distortion of the economic process they induce, 
are always a net loss to all excepting those who 
receive them and would therefore constitute a net 
gain to be reaped by socialization.^
If the spirit of classical capitalism was to provide 
for the good of society through self-interest of the indi­
vidual consumer, what were the economic institutions that 
provided the framework?
The market, which is the characteristic institution 
of capitalism, expresses a relationship of buyer 
and seller. It is, in effect, what results when 
free choice is applied to the disposition of 
property— or of what is made with the use of 
property, by "mixing" labor with it. . . .  So 
we come back to property as the base, for liberty.
Writing at a time when vestiges of the English feudal system
were still present, it is somewhat surprising that Smith
could so readily make the ownership and protection of private
property the basis for classical capitalism. He often
attacked the feudalistic land practices of primogeniture and
entail. The fact that land and its ownership was an integral
part of his system indicates the influence of the Pysiocra1j;s
and the important role of agriculture in the Eighteenth
Century.
^Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1950), pp. 75-75.
^Chamberlain, The Roots of Capitalism, p. 25.
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The market structure also was conceived in the 
laissez faire world of personal liberty. Competition was 
studied as the only form of market structure for the capi­
talist with ease of entry providing an "invisible hand" 
to protect the consumers. In the minds of the classical 
economists pure competition was the market resulting from 
a large number of producers and consumers with the effect 
that no one producer nor any one consumer could affect the 
price. Pure competition set the lowest price possible pro­
tecting the consumer. Pure competition not only protected 
the rights and freedom of the consumer, but it provided the 
most efficient method of both production and the allocation 
of goods.
The free market structure also was extended to the
labor force. Man was to have the liberty of selling his
services in a free market. Smith elaborated a great deal
on the place of labor in the classical economic system. One
integral part of Smith's concept of labor, the utility for
society derived from self-love of the individual, was
described as demonstrating the goals of capitalism. While
preserving the freedom of the individuals, society benefits
f •
from a division of labor. In addition to this type of divi­
sion of labor. Smith writes of a division of labor within 
the production units of the economy. "The pin factory" 
illustration is used to indicate the savings possible from 
the organization of the labor force achieved through the 
division of work.
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In an effort to preserve the liberty of the indi­
vidual, Smith outlines a very limited role to be played by 
the government. The functions of government are restricted 
to those areas which are of benefit to society as a whole 
and would not be provided by private concerns. The first 
duty is the preservation of the country in the world com­
munity. In addition to a national defense. Smith contends 
that the government must protect individuals from injus­
tices within the country. Another and separate discussion 
outlines the duty to protect the commerical entities from 
illegal actions. However, Smith explained that the indi­
vidual must be protected from the monopoly power of the 
commercial enterprises. In many cases the monopoly power 
was granted by the state, but in others the power was derived 
from price collusion. "People of the same trade seldom 
meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in
nsome contrivance to raise prices." The defense roles of 
the government are complemented by the provision of education 
and public works which would not be provided by the private
sector. Education of the youth, as well as>religious instruc-
t •tion, should be provided for society. For the preservation 
and promotion of commerce, such things as roads, bridges, 
and canals should be constructed, but Smith contends these • 
can and should be financed by tolls collected from the users.
^Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Vol. I (London: 
J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1910), p. 117.
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The primary classical institution exemplified in the 
laissez faire market supports and amplifies the goals of 
classical capitalism. The framework of institutions con­
structed by the classical economists provides an organiza­
tional blueprint while the goals provide the motivating 
force. In an effort to see how closely the classical blue­
print has been followed, one needs to typify the modern 
capitalistic systems.
Modern Capitalism— The Real Type 
Although history has never recorded the "atomistic 
capitalism" of Adam Smith, one finds that the modern concept 
of capitalism is farther removed from Smith's model than 
the capitalism of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.
I • *
Evolution has been experienced in both the "means" and the 
"ends" of capitalism, or the "institutions" and the "goals." 
The most referred to system of the new capitalism is demon­
strated in the economy of the United States.
Thus the Eisenhower administration, having inherited 
the evolutionary transformation of the organization 
and control of industry which gave rise to the New 
Deal and Fair Deal and having accepted most of the 
economic measures of the New Deal and Fair Deal, 
in its actual economic policies signalized the i
permanence of the changed economic system. This 
new system might be variously called the Mixed 
Economy, Welfare Capitalism, Progressive Capitalism 
or simply the Organizational Economy, to distinguish 
it from the individual-enterprise, laissez faire, 
private-property economy of old-style capitalism.®
' 8Calvin B. Hoover, The Economy, Liberty and The 
State, Anchor Books (Garden City; Doubleday and Co., 1961), 
p. 270.
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In the present study, the author prefers the term 
"Mixed Capitalism" connoting that many of the goals and 
Institutions of the ideal type of capitalism still permeate 
the present economic system though changed, in nature and 
mixed with aspects of other economic systems.
Before examining in detail the institutional changes
which have caused the many aberrations of capitalism, one
would be wise to examine the shift from the goal of self-
interest to include a goal to provide for social good. "It
is a measure of the magnitude of the disaster to the old
system that when oligopoly or crypto-monopoly is assumed it
no longer follows that any of the old goals of social effi-
9ciency are realized." Because of and effecting changes 
in the institutional framework of capitalism, new goals are 
found in mixed capitalism. These are often defined as 
growth, price stability, and security. The depression of 
the 1930's drastically evidenced some weaknesses in the 
laissez faire capitalism as the large corporations had 
modified it. The fallacy of Say's Law was one of the most 
evident. Instead of opportunity derived from freedom, men 
allowed the government to provide economic security, espe­
cially when this could be provided by the full employment 
of resources in the economy.
Another spirit of capitalism was manifest in the 
form of innovation as described by both Schumpeter and
^John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956), p. 43.
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Galbraith. As technological changes and other types of 
innovation provided for a better life through more goods 
and services provided in a fully employed economy, innova­
tion became a moving force in the new capitalistic econony.
Technology means the systematic application of 
scientific or other organized knowledge to 
practical tasks. Its most important consequence, 
at least for purposes of économies, is in forcing 
the division and subdivision of any such task 
into its component parts.10
Six consequences of the subdivision of tasks are enumerated 
by Galbraith.First, the time from the beginning to 
completion of the task is increased. Concomitant with the 
lengthening of the production process is a requirement for 
increased capital. The third consequence of dividing the 
tasks necessitated by technology is the inflexibility 
resulting from the increased employment of capital. Special­
ization of manpower is the fourth result with an accompany­
ing need for organization being the fifth. Finally, the 
increased complexity demanded by the increasing technology 
associated with the production process demands a longer and 
more detailed planning function. As technology becomes the 
means for increased production through task division, tech­
nology also becomes an end in and of itself. Emphasis is 
placed on technology for the sake of technology.
John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State 
(New York: New American Library, Inc., 1968), p. 24.
^^Ibid., pp. 25-28.
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Schumpeter regarded technology and innovation as the
moving force of capitalism.
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the 
capitalist engine in motion comes from the new 
consumer goods, the new methods of production and 
transportation, the new markets, the new forms of 
industrial organization that capitalist enter­
prise creates.
Price competition is replaced by a completion of new tech­
nology, new products, and new organizations utilizing the 
new technology and new inputs. Schumpeter visualizes the 
"Cirumbling Walls" of capitalism to be produced by the auto­
mating and depersonalization of technology and innovation.
The principal characteristic change in the property 
structure of capitalism is the separation of ownership and 
management. This change comes with, and to a large extent 
because of, the concentration of property. According to 
Hoover, although studies often indicate that labor's share 
of income has remained constant over the past decades, the 
labor share of property has been on the decline. Because 
of the change in property structure, one finds corresponding 
change in the classical concept of capitalism.
The emergence of the large corporation as the 
dominant organizational form of private property  ̂
in production greatly strengthened the tendency 
of the intellectual to think in terms of the 
conflict between "capital" and the public. He no 
longer thinks of this conflict, however, in terms
12Joseph R. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Demociracy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.,
1962), p. 83.
^^Hoover, Economy, Liberty, and the State, p. 207.
:/ ' V; - ' . - ' " \ ̂ :of the interests of the individual capitalist- 
producer versus the public. To most intellectuals 
the conflict has become one between the public 
and the capitalist corporation. There is little 
recognition that an even greater conflict of 
interest might exist between the public and the 
management of a nationalized industry or between 
the management and the workers in the industry.
Any sympathy or admiration which -in the past 
might have been felt for the capitalist as an 
individual owner-producer is not likely to be 
extended to the corporation.".....indeed as a growing 
proportion of the population became employees 
rather than individual producers, and as stock­
holders come to feel less and less identification 
with the corporation, the person who thinks of 
the corporation as "we" becomes rarer and rarer.
To almost everyone the corporation becomes an 
anonymous "it" or "they.
What then happens to competition when big business
becomes the typical market institution? "The price system
will fulfill its function only if competition prevails,
that is, if the individual producer has to adapt himself
to price changes and cannot control them. One might ask
whether competition is absent from mixed capitalism?
Economists are at long last emerging from the stage 
in which price competition was all they saw. As 
soon as quality competition and sales effort are 
admitted into the saved precincts of theory, the -g 
price variable is ousted from its dominant position.
With industrialization progressing to the stage where many
industries are dominated by a few sellers, "each seller
shares the common in secure and certain prices; it is to
^^Ibid., p. 363.
A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago; 
University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 49.
^^Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,
p. 84.
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the advantage of none to disrupt this mutual security 
s y s t e m . T h e  mature corporation views price control as 
necessary to insure profits in an atmosphere where tech­
nology has caused a lengthening of the production process 
and a deepening of capital is required with the new 
techniques. Price competition has been greatly reduced by 
the concentration of business, but a new type of competi­
tion has emerged. Galbraith contends that because of the 
opulence associated with the mature economy, product differ­
entiation becomes a strong element in competition. Another 
form of competition manifests itself in the form of 
"countervailing power." The answer is that competition is 
not absent but that it has greatly changed.
The concentration of property brings the economic
system farther and farther from "atomistic" competition on
which the classical system was based.
With many notable exceptions— agriculture, the 
textile and garment industries, soft coal mining, 
wholesale and retail trade, shoe manufacturing—  
the number of firms participating in a business is 
likely to be at its maximum within a few years or 
even a few months after the business is born.
Thereafter there is, typically, a steady decline 
until a point of stability is reached with a 
handful of massive survivors and, usually a 
fringe of smaller hangers-on. Thenceforward the 
changes in the industry are in the relative 
positions of the established firms. This is not 
the universal pattern of development, but it is 
a typical one.^®
^^Galbraith, New Industrial State, p. 41. 
^®Galbriath, American Capitalism, p. 33.
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Competition in the classical sense requires that a
large number of sellers sell to a large number of buyers
with no individual buyer or seller in a position to influence
the price. With only four major automobile companies in
that industry, one could not conceive that any of the four
would not be able to affect prices. The automobile industry
is not as much the exception as it is the typical market
structure of mixed capitalism.
The five hundred largest corporations produce 
close to half of all the goods and services that 
are available annually in the United States.
. . .  in the characteristic market of the industrial 
system there are only a handful of sellers. The 
domestic automobile market is shared by four firms 
and dominated by three. Markets for primary 
aluminum, copper, rubber, cigarettes, soap and 
detergents, whiskey, heavy electrical gear, 
structural steel, cans, computers, aircraft engines, 
sugar, biscuits, pig iron, iron, tinplate, trucks 
and a host of other items are each dominated by 
four firms. Nearly all are examples of the mature 
corporation with which we are concerned. Such is 
the industrial system.19
Just as changes have evolved in the market of goods 
and services, the labor sector has been greatly changed by 
the establishment of big business. The power of the cor­
poration left labor in a vulnerable position with very 
little strength to be used against the monopsonists of labor.
I ■
The government was called on to give legitimacy to labor 
unions, but it was not until the 1930's that labor forces 
were allowed to construct an opposing power, which was 
brought by unionization.
^^Galbraith, The New Industrial State, pp. 14,
190.
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The operation of countervailing power is to he 
seen with the greatest clarity in the labor market 
where it is also most fully developed. Because 
of his comparative immobility, the individual 
worker has long been highly vulnerable to private 
economic power, . . . The economic power that the 
worker faced in the sale of his labor— the 
competition of many sellers dealing with few 
buyers— made it necessary that he organize for
his own protection.20
And organize he did, with the help of the government and 
changes of various economic institutions. Now, one recog­
nizes that the economic power of the large corporations is 
checked by the countervailing power of the unions.
JUst as government played an important role in the 
labor sector of the economy, many other economic sectors 
have felt the impact of government participation in the
economy. The federal government of the United States, for
\ • *
example, passed an Employment Act of 1946 which established 
it as one of the guiding forces of the economy. In the 
declaration of policy in the 1946 piece of legislation one 
finds Congress accepting the burden of directing the 
economy.
The Congress declares that it is the con­
tinuing policy and responsibility of the Federal 
Government to use all practicable means consistent 
with its needs and obligations and other essential  ̂
cconsiderations of national policy, with the assis­
tance and cooperation of industry, agriculture, 
labor, and State and local governments, to coor­
dinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and 
resources for the purpose of creating and main­
taining, in a manner calculated to foster and 
promote free competitive enterprise and the general 
wèlfare, conditions under which there will be
^°Ibid., p. 114.
'
afforded useful employment opportunities, including 
self-employment, for those able, willing, and 
seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, 
production, and purchasing power.21
The legislation was passed as the result of several 
factors. First, the Great Depression of the 1930's in the 
United States destroyed the concept of automatic main­
tenance of full employment which.had been so extensively 
used by the classical writers. Keynes pointed out that 
employment depends on effective demand. As employment 
increases, income increases, but consumption will rise less 
than income leaving a gap which produces unemployment. 
Investment must increase the amount of the difference to 
provide full employment. The increase in investment is not 
"automatic" although some forces of taxation, government 
welfare, and unemployment benefits automatically tend to 
provide for full employment. A fall in consumption may not 
be counteracted by an increase in investment as the classical 
writers asserted, and the result would be unemployment.
World War II provided full employment, but not without 
inflationary pressures. Many felt the economy would suffer 
a relapse in the post war period. The theoretical base pro­
vided by J. M. Keynes acted as a basis for constructing 
the legislation.
The legislation which finally emerged . . . 
wisely abstained from diagnosing depression as
21Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.; 
United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 170.
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the disease and public works as the cure, but 
instead concentrated on establishing the principle 
of continuing Government responsibility to appraise 
and review economic developments, diagnose problems, 
and prescribe appropriate r e m e d i e s . 22
In the evaluation of twenty years under the act, the Council
of Economic Advisors in 1966 outlined some of the successes
and failures in meeting the goals of the act. One finds it
inconceivable that the government will remove itself from
the economic role outlined in the Employment Act of 1946.
The government in modern capitalism plays a much 
more extensive and intensive role than those envisioned by 
Adam Smith. The change of this institution has been an 
evolutionary process with the government playing a larger 
role in the economy through controls, restrictions, guidance 
and spending.
The economics most representative of modern capitalism 
as typified above are found in Australia, Canada, West 
Germany, Japan, and the United States. These countries are 
used in this study because their goals and institutions more 
closely fit the goals and institutions of capitalism and are 
representative of this system.
Classical Democratic Socialism— The Ideal Type
The second economic system based on freedom for the 
individual and couched in a democratic form of government 
is that of socialism, which system will be termed "democratic
22%bid., p. 171.
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socialism" to prevent confusion. Marx also writes of the 
socialist system which is a transitional stage to pure 
communism. Democratic socialism is to be differentiated 
from the Marxian stage not only by goals but also by the 
power centers and the institutions. Democratic socialism, 
as is true of capitalism, differs in concept from the 
classical scheme. For this reason it is necessary to 
elaborate on the goals and institutions of both ideal and 
real types of democratic socialism.
By socialist society we shall designate an 
institutional pattern in which the control over 
means of production and over production itself is 
vested with a central authority— or, as we may say, 
in which as a matter of principle, the economic 
affairs of society belong to the public and not 
to the private sphere. Socialism has been called 
an intellectual Proteus.23
In addition to the collective ownership of the means of
production, classical democratic socialism denotes a freedom
of choice in the majority of the consumers' markets. What,
then, is the goal of a system of public ownership and
democracy? In general one can say that the democratic
socialist system was conceived in order to benefit society
and the workers within that society while preserving the
identity and freedom of the individual. This purpose is to
be accomplished by returning to society the profits derived
from production. The idealistic Fabians constructed their
socialism around the following concept.
p. 167.
23Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,
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If capital can be socialized, Labor will 
benefit by it fully; but while Capital is left in 
the hands of a few. Poverty must be the lot of 
many. . . .The time approaches when Capital can 
be made public property, no longer at the disposal 
of a few, but o^ed by the community for the 
benefit of a l l . 24
The Fabian Society in England- first expounded on
the theory of democratic socialism. The group was lead by
such intellectuals as George Bernard Shaw, Beatrice and
Sidney Webb, G. D. H. Cole and Annie Besant. The socialism
of the Fabian Society was not of the Marxist variety, and
revolution, except through evolutionary democratic processes,
did not appeal to the society. Instead, the beginnings of
socialism were already apparent in capitalism. Private
property had not been an institution which eliminated poverty
but just the reverse.
With one law alone— the law of rent— they destroyed 
the whole series of assumptions upon which private 
property is based. The apriorist notion that among 
free competitors wealth must go to the industrious, 
and poverty be the just and natural punishment of 
the lazy and improvident, proved as illusory as 
the apparent flatness of the earth.25
The crux of the socialist discussion centered on the elimi­
nation of the disparity in income caused by the private 
appropriation of rent.
^^Allan G. Gruchy, Comparative Economic Systems 
(Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955), p. 448.
^^George Bernard Shaw, Fabian Essays, reprinted 
in Comparative Economic Systems: A Reader, edited by
Marshall I. Goldman (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 99.
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The argument was that the profit earned from the 
means of production were not earned as wages, but were un­
earned income which individuals did not have a right to claim.
What the achievement of Socialism involves 
economically, is the transfer of rent from the 
class which now appropriates it to the whole 
people. Rent being;that part of the produce which 
is individually unearned, this is the only equitable 
method of disposing of it. There is no means of 
getting rid of economic rent . . .  The economic 
object of Socialism is not, of course, to equalize 
farmers and shopkeepers in couples, but to carry 
out the principle over the whole community by 
collecting all rents and throwing them into the 
national treasury.2°
Theoretically nationalization of production is to 
be used as a means to achieve a "higher" freedom, that of 
economic freedom. Hayek expresses the spirit of democratic 
socialism in his Road to Serfdom. The goal is an idealistic 
one as indicated by the tone of the Hayek passage.
To allay these suspicions and to harness to 
its cart the strongest of all political motives, 
the craving for freedom, socialism began increas­
ingly to make use of the promise of a "new 
freedom." The coming of socialism was to be the 
leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of 
freedom. It was to bring "economic freedom," 
without which the political freedom already gained 
was "not worth having." Only socialism was cap­
able of effecting the consummation of the agelong 
struggle for freedom in which the attainment of 
political freedom was but a first step.27.
I ■
According to the theory of Oskar Lange socialism 
will produce the capitalistic type of competitive market in 
consumer goods and in labor while other production goods
26ibid., pp. 100-01.
27Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 19.
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such as capital are priced by the Central Planning Board. 
"The prices for capital goods and productive resources 
outside of labor are thus prices in the generalized sense, 
i.ei mere indices of alternatives available, fixed for 
accounting purposes. The problem ,of the socialistic 
market centers on the combination of the planned producers 
market and the competitive market of the consumer goods 
and labor. Since the incomes of the consumer and consumer 
demands are determined by the market, the "prices" of the 
producers goods must be set in such a manner that the most 
efficient means of production are achieved with a goal of 
maximizing total utility to society being the guiding 
principle as opposed to profit maximization. The rule for 
determining output is the competitive rule that the marginal 
cost should be equal to the price. This illustrates the 
importance of establishing prices for producer goods that 
reflect true costs since this determines marginal cost. 
Ludwig von Mises argues that the absence of a market in the 
sector of producing goods makes it impossible to achieve 
the most efficient methods of production since the market 
forces cannot be simulated by a Central planning Board.
Lange contends that the establishment of prices for the 
production goods could be used for the establishment of 
production functions that could guide the managers in a
28Oskar Lange, On the Economic Theory of Socialism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938), p. 73.
capitalistic system, Schumpeter tends to agree that
socialism can work.
There is nothing wrong with the pure logic of 
socialism. And this is so obvious that it would 
not have occurred to me to insist on it were it 
not for the fact that it has been denied and the 
still more curious fact that orthodox socialists, 
until they were taught their business by economists 
of strongly bourgeois views and sympathies failed 
to produce an answer that would meet scientific 
requirements.29
Labor in the classical socialist market is provided
the same freedom as realized in the competitive society.
Freedom of movement is insured and wages are based on the
type of job and its related supply and demand.
The income of consumers is composed of two parts: 
one part being the receipts for the labor services 
performed and the other part being a social dividend 
constituting the individual's share in the income 
derived from the capital and the natural resources 
owned by society.
In this way labor is paid more than its marginal revenue
product. The production of this type of welfare is one of
the key features of classical socialism and an equalizing
31factor without the loss of freedom. Also, Pigou argues 
that socialism provides a more stable employment which is 
less subject to large amounts of unemployment than capi­
talism, thus providing an additional welfare feature of
p. 172,
pgSchumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,
^^Lange, On the Economic Theory of Socialism, p. 73, 
31A. C, Pigou, Socialism Versus Capitalism (London:
Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1964), p. 47,
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socialism. Although thé frictional unemployment would not 
be significantly different in the socialist state as opposed 
to the capitalist/ unemployment resulting from fluctuations 
in industrial investment would be lower. Under the capi­
talist ^stem, investment decisions which cause employment 
fluctuations are not considered as a cost. The investment 
decisions of socialism are made by the state/ and unemploy­
ment would be considered as a cost to society/ and it would 
be the responsibility of the state to consider the cost of 
unemployment when making investment decisions.
Although much of the labor sector is "capitalistic" 
in nature/ classical socialism does not give the same type 
of treatment to property. The rent derived from property 
is to benefit the socialist community and would accrue to 
the state.
All that is commercial or capitalistic about ground 
rent/ in both its economic and its sociological 
associations, and all that can possibly be sympa­
thetic to the advocate of private property (private 
income, the landlord and so on) has been completely 
removed.
The same is true of the means of providing goods and services 
which under classical socialism are to be owned by the 
peopl^/ who would then benefit from the economic rent. ^
' The transition to a socialist system presents a 
theoretical problem in collective ownership of property as
' ^^Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,
p. 181.
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a means of redistribution. Pigou^^ points out that confisca­
tion of private property would render to the state about 
one-third of the total income which could be used to pro­
vide a more equitable distribution of income. The demo­
cratic socialist writers, however, did not propose that 
confiscation be used as the transitional device. The 
transition problem is then quite apparent.
They propose to purchase the means of production 
from their present holders at a fair valuation; 
that is, they propose to hand over to them govern­
ment scrip, the interest on which, when allowance 
has been made for diminished risk of loss, will 
be roughly equivalent to what the private holders 
are now receiving as income from their property.
In other words, apart from minor adjustments, the 
distribution of income among persons will be 
exactly the same after the introduction of socialism 
as it was b e f o r e . 34
Of course, once this initial purchase has been completed 
strong fiscal measures such as death taxes and steep grad­
uated income taxes could be used to help redistribute the 
income. However, the problem remains that the government 
purchase of private property would not have an immediate 
effect on equality of income.
The government, after having taken over private 
property (whether by confiscation or purchase), then must 
assume its new role dictated by a socialist economic system. 
The implementation of a Central Planning Board as a substi­
tute for the market and management provided through
^^Pigou, Socialism Versus Capitalism, p. 25.
^^Ibid., p. 26.
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capitalism would be an essential element of government.
The establishment of price indexes would be no small respon­
sibility and gives an indication of the many new economic 
problems associated with government ownership. One cannot 
help but envision a large bureaucracy evolving. The central 
planning inherent in a socialist system was not completely 
recognized by the framers of socialism and was not given the 
attention which it demands. The problems are associated 
with the institutional framework or techniques rather than 
with the goals of classical socialism.
Modern Democratic Socialism 
"Socialism today cannot be considered a clearly 
definable system either existing or postulated, but only a 
tendency to look more favorably on some measures and less 
favorably on others than is done by the supporters of 
capitalism or communism. One finds that the existing 
socialist economies are guided by goals which are not too 
far different from the underlying motivators of the classical 
writers or in some cases— mixed capitalism. Freedom is 
stressed as the primary ingredient of the consumer market 
segment while nationalization of industry is to promote the 
general economic welfare of society as a whole. "They want 
a society in which the elements of antagonism play a smaller
35The reader is referred to an excellent discussion 
of some of the problems in Pigou, Socialism Versus Capitalism, 
Chapter VII.
^^Landauer, Contemporary Economic Systems, p. 231.
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role than in capitalist society, and the elements of com-
37scious human solidarity play a greater one." Although 
one sees the evolution towards this goal in the capitalist 
society, the difference between the two is to be found in 
the intensity of feeling and the degree to which action has 
been taken in moving toward the achievement of the goal.
In the Scandinavian countries public enterprise is utilized 
in conjunction with the private enterprise segment most 
efficiently to produce the largest amount of national output. 
The goal of large national output is directed at the whole 
of society rather than at individuals and at times takes 
precedence over the goal of individual freedom. The conflict 
of goals is one noted in the classical blueprint of socialism 
and is presently demonstrated in socialist countries.
One cannot discuss the socialist market without 
including the government institution since in classical and 
modern socialism these two institutions are interrelated. 
"Today nearly half the total gross investment /In Britaii^ 
is financed by the public authorities."^® A great deal of 
the government participation is found in the welfare programs 
such as those found in the Scandinavian countries where the 
programs are directed at family welfare, workers protection 
and welfare, social housing, health, and social assistance. 
Government participation in these programs necessarily
'̂̂Ibid., p. 297.
OQHoover, Economy, Liberty, and the State, p. 157.
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reduces private enterprise in areas such as medicine, 
housing, and insurance. The extensive welfare system of 
socialism is a manifestation of the ideology of promoting 
the general welfare of the nation. The achievement of the 
goal of providing for national welfare may appear to conflict 
with the goal of individual freedom since most of the pro­
grams now in existence are compulsory programs. However, 
Clark Lee Allen correctly contends that "economic freedom
39may be viewed simply as the availability of alternatives." 
Poverty or ignorance are often more restrictive of economic 
freedom than public statutes. Viewing freedom for the 
individual in this light, the socialist goal of maximum 
social benefit as expressed in welfare programs is paramount 
to individual freedom goals.
In regard to nationalization of industry, one con­
cludes that there has been a large amount of government 
ownership of the large industries in the socialist countries 
since World War II. The types of industry nationalized are, 
to a degree, similar in Great Britain and the Scandinavian 
countries. The primary industries of transportation, 
communication, power, natural resources and financial are 
nationalized in almost all of the socialist countries. In 
addition to the primary industries, the auxiliary undertakings
^^Clark Lee Allen, "Economic Freedom and Public 
Policy," in Economic Systems and Public Policy; Essays in 
Honor of Calvin Bryce Hoover edited by Robert S. Smith and 
Frank Tide Vyver (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1966), p. 7.
which are an integral part of the primary industries are 
brought under national ownership. Naturally; the financial 
nature of these industries and the large amount of capital 
required has a great effect on the capital market which 
again illustrates the effect, of nationalization on the 
private sector.
Government control of the economy in an effort to 
direct it has a similar influence on private industry. In 
all of the economies of socialism, one finds a concerted 
effort to plan and guide the economy. Although one finds 
the government of a capitalist country makes some effort to 
guide the economy, the socialist government is much more 
direct and the efforts more extensive than those of their 
capitalist counterparts. Investment taxes are used more 
extensively to soften the effects of cycles as well as of 
the large government investments. The labor force is mani­
pulated to some extent through government programs of 
retraining and relocation.
The difference in the socialist government inter­
vention and that of the capitalist countries is one of degree 
and direct action. Although the goals of government inter­
vention are similar, the active and direct participation of 
the socialist governments is absent in the capitalist system. 
For example, the recession of the early 1960's was caused, 
to a large extent, by a calculated government slowdown in 
Britain resulting in only 2 per cent unemployment. In the
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United States unemployment reached 6 per cent, and the 
recession was in response to the actions in the private 
sector.
These efforts to promote national economic welfare
are directed in England by the National Development Council
which began operation in 1962 and by similar agencies in
the Scandinavian countries. These boards are directed to * #
achieve maximum economic development while preserving the
"soundness" of the econony. In England,
. . . the Council itself is made up of some twenty 
industrialists (representing public as well as 
private enterprises), trade unionists and inde­
pendent members, with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer as chairman. These boards act as 
investigators, pressure croups, target-setters, 
and market researchers.40
Planning for the growth of the economy and using the exten­
sive public role in the econony, these groups are in a 
stronger position to influence the economy than, for example, 
the Council of Economic Advisors. The goals of socialism 
allow for government intervention.
Although one is impressed with the degree of govern­
ment ownership and control of the economy through its 
participation in the extensive welfare programs, ownership 
of the major industries, huge investments in the economy 
and the direction of the economy through planning boards, 
the majority of economic activity is still found in the
4®Jan S. Prybyla, ed.. Comparative Economic Systems
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 177.
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private sector. Private industry is found primarily in 
the small retail outlets, repair services, and agriculture. 
Even in these areas one notices government involvement.
The socialist government and economy is greatly 
influenced by, and also influences, the labor movement 
typical in socialism. The degree of centralization and 
organization is markedly higher in the socialist countries 
than in the capitalist countries. The union membership as 
a percentage of non-agriculture employment in 1954 ranged 
from a low of 47 per cent in the United Kingdom to a high 
of 62 per cent in Sweden as compared to the United States 
of 34 per cent.^^ Although the labor movement in all of 
the western countries began as both a political and economic 
movement, the capitalist countries have evolved into insti­
tutions based primarily on economic foundations while the 
socialist labor unions are political as well as economical. 
The political involvement is used to direct the distribution 
of income more to the workers. The interest in wage earners 
income and welfare benefits again is the demonstration of 
socialist goals. "The traditonal meaning of socialism, 
collective ownership of the means of production, is no \ 
longer applicable as a basic criterion since practically all 
socialist parties in the Western World refuse to put primary 
emphasis on this p o s t u l a t e . "^2 private property is still
^^Gruchy, Comparative Economic Systems, p. 313.
42Landauer, Contemporary Economic Systems, p. 231.
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dominant in the typical, modern socialist country. The 
governments tend to allow private businesses to operate on 
a private basis as long as their actions are in support 
of the national goals. In the areas where this is not found 
to be the case, national controls or restrictions are used 
such as in the case of price and wage controls. Most often 
the private concern is used as the form of business modified 
through government controls.
Although one can see socialism as being successful 
to some degree in the redistribution of income, the socialist 
system has not enjoyed the same success in the distribution 
of property. In most of the .socialist countries about half 
of the wealth is held by the top 10 per cent of the popula-. 
tion. Even where high property and death taxes are used, 
the income from the privately held property is sufficiently 
high to maintain concentrated ownership.
The nationalization program in the socialist countries
has highlighted many problems associated with nationalization.
First, the splitting of the Social Democratic parties into
Communist and non-Communist factions has eroded the solidarity
of th^ nationalization forces. Also, the Labor Party hals
recognized that the benefits of nationalization have not
been derived, especially in the reduction of income inequality.
Thirdly, the management of the nationalized firms has been 
isimilar to government bureaucracy. In addition unemployment 
had not been high in the private sector so this advantage
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of nationalization was minimized. Finally, nationalization 
of firms did not provide the same results as the nationali­
zation of an entire industry.
The countries which were most representative of 
democratic socialism in the post World War II period are 
Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Although it has 
been demonstrated that these countries are not good approxi­
mations of classical socialism, the goals and institutions 
are socialistic and more closely approximate socialism than 
capitalism or authoritarian socialism. Denis A. Flagg 
found these countries to have a high degree of government 
ownership and w e l f a r e . I n  addition Myron H. Ross points 
out a higher degree of central planning than is found in 
the typical capitalist country.
43Denis A. Flagg and Virginia G. Flagg, "An 
Empirical Application of Measures of Socialism to Different 
Nations," Western Economic Journal, VIII, No. 3 (1970), 
233-40.
^^^yron H. Ross, "Fluctuations in Economic Activity: 
Planned and Free-Market Economies, 1950-60: Comment
/followed by G. J. Staller's Reply/," American Economic 
Review, LV (March, 1965), 158-64.
CHAPTER IV
THE TRADITIONAL AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
Introduction
The economic systems of the traditional society and 
the corraminist countries are couched in a non-democratic 
political system. The traditional economic system and the 
communist economic system are discussed in this chapter.
The goals and institutions of the two systems are enumerated, 
as was done for the democratic economic systems of the 
previous chapter. Although much could be written about the 
various goals and institutions, only the factors which are 
significant and necessary for the definition of the system 
are utilized in this chapter. The ideal type of communism 
is compared to the modern communist system where the Soviet 
Union is the prototype.
 ̂ Traditional Economic System ^
“A traditional society is one whose structure is 
developed within limited production functions, based on pre- 
Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian 
attitüdes toward physical world. when one examines the
Ŵ. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1967), p. 4.
62
63
traditional economic system,^ the traditional system is 
found to be the more characteristic system of the economies 
of history and modern day society. The modern traditional 
society is not far different from the feudalistic systems 
of medieval Europe. "Economic progress is not inevitable, 
nor has it been typical of human societies. Stagnation 
has, perhaps, been the more normal condition of economic 
life. Resistance to change is strong in every society and 
medieval Europe was no exception.Rostow, in his descrip­
tion of the traditional society, does not contend that an 
increase in output cannot occur in the traditional society, 
but that the means of output are "primitive," that output 
per head will not increase a great deal, and that most of 
the increase in output will be due to the use of more natural 
resources. Also, one will find that a high proportion of 
resources will be utilized in the agricultural sector.
The modern traditional economic system is typically 
characterized by both a technical and sociological dualism 
which has been of particular interest to some development 
economists. Dr. J. H. Boeke has constructed a theory of 
sociological dualism which he defines as "the clashing of an 
imported social system with an indigenous social system of
^The term "traditional" is used to denote the type 
of system which is typified below.
^Dudley Dillard, The Economics of J. M. Keynes,
The Theory of a Monetary Policy (London: Crosby Lockwood &
Son Ltd., 1966), p. 26.
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another style. Most frequently the imported social system 
is high capitalism. But it may be socialism or communism 
just as well, or a blending of them, The underlying 
thesis is that the invading system is one of the Western 
culture based on a goal of imlimited jieeds, and the indige­
nous sector has confined itself to the maintenance of the 
status quo, or limited needs. In this type of situation, 
workers in the traditional society, Boeke contends, will not 
be motivated to work more in the case of increased hourly 
wages, but because of their limited needs will actually work 
less. Boeke' s theory has been criticized because of some 
of the policy implications, but the concept of social dualism 
does give insight into twentieth century traditional 
economies.
HaganS uses the dualism concept to characterize the 
idealized form of a peasant society.
A peasant society, he (Hagan) says, is first of 
all a dual society. It consists of a number of 
agricultural villages with one or more centers, 
which are trading cities or the king's courts.
There is little migration into or out of each village.
The occupation of the majority of people is small- 
scale agriculture, although there are a few crafts­
men and traders. The family form is usually the 
extended family. Relationships among villages 
'may be limited to a trickle of trade.' The elite 
live in the center, except for a-few officials, 
teachers and rent collectors who represent the
Ĵ. H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual 
Societies (New York; 1953), p. vi.
^Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development, Principles,
Problems, and Policies (New York; W. W. Norton & Company,
1959), p. 302.
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central government in the villages^ The society 
has little contact with foreign countries, 'though 
a small trickle of trade, and with it a small - 
trickle-of ideas across national borders, occurs.'
Notice, the above characteristics are of the ideal type
while the prototype of the traditional society follows below.
In addition to the social dualism model of Boeke, 
Benjamin Higgins has developed â -model of technological 
dualism. "The two sectors are the industrial sector (mines, 
oil fields, refineries, etc.) and a rural sector engaged in 
production of foodstuffs and in handicrafts or very small 
industries. The first of these sectors is capital 
intensive."^ The second sector is very labor intensive, and 
the production functions along with their technical coeffi­
cients are quite different, instead of replacing the idea 
of social dualism, technical dualism complements and 
strengthens Boeke's model.
The interrelationships between the two sectors pro­
vide an interesting area of study both for the development 
and systems economists. For the development of the indus­
trial sector, labor must be drawn away from the traditional 
sector and made useful through investment in human capital 
for the new types of work necessary in the industrialist 
enterprises. The two sectors within the economy provide 
sub-systems of the more general traditional system of which
Gibid., p. 303. 
?Ibid., p. 326.
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the presence of the two sectors is ah integral characteris­
tic. An important area for further research is an analysis 
of how the interaction of the two sectors influence the 
traditional economic system and its evolution towards an 
advanced system of capitalism# socialism, or communism.
Can one apply the concept of the traditional economic 
system with a justification from the methodology of economic 
systems in chapter II? The author feels that the use of 
the traditional economic system is completely in keeping 
with the methodology, because by its use one can determine 
the motivating goals of the system, and the institutions 
which are characteristic of a traditional economy.
QMax Weber illustrated the methodology of typifica-. 
tion in the case of the early feudal system. The basic goal 
of the economic system of the feudal society (seigniorialism) 
was one of maintaining the status quo. Production was to be 
sufficient to maintain a traditional life style for all of 
society. The social caste system was to be protected with 
the nobility being served by the serfs.
With a decentralized political system, the manor was 
the political and economic production unit of seigniorialism. 
Noblemen were granted the manor in return for political and 
military allegiance to the king. The work order of the manor
was primarily serfs with some free peasants. If the work1______I_________________
pMax Weber, General Economic History, translated by , 
Frank H. Knight (Glencoe, Illinois; The Free Press, 1950), 
Chapters III and IV.
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order was peasant, the land was to be rented from the 
nobleman with any surplus being taxed as additional rent.
In general the manor was a self-sufficient production unit 
with farming, hunting, and small craft shops providing the 
needs of the manor.
City markets were permanent markets regulated by the 
merchant and craft guilds. The city markets provided the 
goods and services required in the urban areas primarily 
through small shops which were both retailers and producers. 
The status quo was maintained in the form of guild associa­
tions which served as the regulating agency determining 
entrance and quality standards.
One can construct the ideal type of feudalism by 
selecting the core features most representative of the 
economy. First, the production was designed to perpetuate 
the status quo. Secondly, the basic work order was based on 
a form of slavery (serfdom) . The political system was a 
decentralized system of political and military power. The 
fourth core feature was a code of social honor which person­
alized the political and military relationships among the 
nobil:̂ ty. The manor system was the basic political and  ̂
economic unit. The sixth core feature was that the total 
product was to be consumed. The seventh and final core 
feature required that the tools of warfare were to be pro­
duced* and owned exclusively by the upper-class who had 
spent most of their life learning the skills of warfare.
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Many similarities are evident between medieval 
England and the modern traditional society; especially in 
the goals. The n-achievement factor developed by Professor 
McClelland is an attempt at measurement of human motives 
and represents the achievement ideas and images of the 
people within a country. He has found that this score or 
measurement is significantly lower for people in the 
countries with a traditional economic system than that 
found in the more advanced countries.^ This indicates a 
lack of individuals with an "entrepreneurial motivational 
complex. " The significance of this study on the examination 
of goals motivating the system is obvious. The people have 
neither the desire nor ability for the progressive develop­
ment found in advanced countries.
The lack of obvious opportunity feeds on itself,
and the goals become oriented towards the status quo.
The value system of these societies was generally 
geared to what might be called a long-run fatalism; 
that is, the assumption that the range of possi­
bilities open to one's grandchildren would be just 
about what it had been for one's grandparents.
But this long-run fatalism by no means excluded the 
short-run option that, within a considerable range, 
it was possible and legitimate for the individual 
t^ strive to improve his lot within his lifetime.^® ̂
The status quo goal for the society is prevalent within
most of the countries with a traditional economic system.
QHiggins, Economic Development, Principles, 
problems and Policies, p. 255.
^^Robert C. Meier, William T. Newell, and Harold L, 
pazer. Simulation in Business and Economics (Englewood 
Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 14.
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The goals of the traditional economic system vary 
by the status of the individual. The power groups view the 
e:iq>ort trade as an opportunity for increased wealth and 
power. The tendency is to encourage trade even at the 
expense of creating a situation in which their country 
becomes even more dependent on the dominant countries which 
are using trade as a form of exploitation. The small land 
holders concentrate on a goal of providing a better life 
for their children and maintaining their own position of 
independence. More land can mean better education and a 
better economic situation for future generations. The large 
majority of the people# however# must be content with status 
quo# and the goals remain constant.
With the introduction of the modern sector# there 
has been developing a desire for products and the life style 
of the Western world. The goals# although possibly now in 
the process of transition# are presently status quo oriented. 
The resources are not readily available, either human# raw 
materials or capital. One finds the fatalistic attitude 
remaining whether it be justified or not. "The people of
the underdeveloped areas are more eager to consume the goods
* '
of the Western world# than they are to duplicate the saving 
and the quantity and quality of work which have produced 
the higher standard of living in the West."^^ The wishes
^^Higgins# Economic Development, Principles#
Problems and Policies, p. 255.
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or dreams have not yet been transformed into the motivating 
force that could be classified as a goal of the system.
The market institution of the traditional economic 
system can be divided into the dual sectors analogous to 
those mentioned above. But a third sector must be included 
in the discussion of the market system because in practically 
all of these countries the international market is a large 
segment of the commercial enterprise.
The first sector is the market found in the rural 
areas and the small villages. The commodities traded are 
primarily the necessities of food and clothing, and a very 
competitive market exists in many areas. The "one price" 
system is often absent with a great deal of bargaining 
resulting, products brought to the villages from the indus­
trial sector are mostly sold in a monopoly market since the 
demand is not large enough for more than one outlet.
In addition to the village markets, the rural market
includes the trade that transpires between the large land
owners and the tenant farmers. The trade is one based on an
imbalance of power in which the land owner uses the market
to his advantage. Goods are sold by the owner to the tenant
farmer, often at inflated prices. This market is used by
the land owner to maintain his power relationship by keeping
the tenant in debt to him. In Puerto Rico,
. . . the small farm store, owned by the patron, 
helped to insure a steady labor supply. Not only 
did it keep the tenant in debt to the owner so it 
was impossible for him to move away, it also was
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a source of income which returned to the landlord 
almost all of the money paid out by him in w a g e s . 12
As the industrialized sector grows larger, the effect 
of the rural sector is generally detrimental.
Imagine, for example, a typical underdeveloped 
country exporting, say petroleum and plantation 
products; importing textiles, other consumer dur­
ables, and luxury foodstuffs; producing rice, fish, 
and handicraft products in the rural sector and 
trading in these. Favorable development in the 
industrialized sector (improved techniques, higher 
world market prices) will not increase the demand 
for the output of the rural sector. Indeed, in so 
far as the rise in income of the industrialized 
sector is shared by domestic workers, the demand 
for output of the rural sector may even fall as 
these workers substitute 'superior' imported 
consumers' goods for home produced ones. On the 
other hand, any favorable development in the rural 
sector will increase the demand for industrial 
products imported into that sector (either from 
outside the country or from the industrial sector 
of the same country) and reduce the demand for 
output of the rural sector.
Almost all of the countries with a traditional eco­
nomic system have one or more cities in which a more Western 
type of market exists. The competition is stronger, and 
more goods meet more consumers. These are the expanding 
markets which bring about the kind of changes described in 
the above quote. A major part of the industrial market is 
the international market which is of prime importance to
rthe economic well being of the country.
T. D. Curtis, Land Reform, Democracy and Economic 
Interest in Puerto Rico (Tucson; University of Arizona 
Press, 1956), p. 21.
.̂ ^Higgins, Economic Development, principles.
Problems, and Policies, p. 382.
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A professor^^ from the University of Chile stresses 
the strong dependence established through the international 
trade market. The trade is monopolistic with the countries 
of the traditional economic system suffering from the im­
balance of power. The dominant countries are free to estab­
lish the terms of trade. The surplus generated in the tradi­
tional countries is transferred to. the dominant countries. 
Although much of the capital used in production is brought 
into the underdeveloped country, much of the financing is 
done from within the dependent country. Using the imbalance 
of power, the dominant nation can exploit both the labor and 
financial resources of the traditional society. "The result 
is to limit the development of their internal market and 
their technical and cultural capacity.
The export trade does not always have the desired 
effect on the economy which the development economist would 
hope. Instead of producing a strong educational, training 
and industrialization program within the country, the methods 
of increasing production are often simply adding more land 
and more labor to an already labor and land intensive pro­
duction process. One beneficial spin-off from the export
I.trade is a good public transportation system. However, the 
import and export market often adds to the dualism within
^^Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence,'.' 
American Economic Review, LX, No. 2 (May, 1970), 231-36.
ISlbid., p. 231.
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thé country rather than to the advancement of the total 
econoriy.
In a summation of the traditional economic system 
market, one of the countries of the study, Ceylon, provides 
a good typification of this type of market.
To even a greater extent than in Western 
countries, retail markets do not fit neatly into 
the textbook models. The government is the sole 
importer of rice and sugar and sells rationed 
quantities of subsidized rice through officially 
sponsored co-operative stores, and imports and 
distributes products through a marketing organiza­
tion that has the power to impose maximum and 
minimum prices upon the companies that compete 
with it. Westernized retail houses with stan­
dardized and trademarked items usually sell their 
merchandise at quoted prices, but elsewhere 
bargaining is common. In Colombo and a few other 
towns outlets range from fairly large department 
stores to a very small shops and stalls in 
farmers' markets; in most towns all outlets are 
quite small. Except in Colombo the volume of 
business transacted within an area is usually so 
slight as to enforce spatial monopoly or oligopoly, 
and in many lines even Colombo's sales are too 
few for multiple sellers. Class divisions and 
language barriers as well as imperfect knowledge 
limit both current competition and the entry of 
new firms; and the lack of a strong tradition of 
business enterprise plus the relatively low 
prestige which trade enjoys among the better- 
educated Ceylonese also tends to keep profits 
from efficiently fulfilling their textbookfunctions.16
Countries which have a traditional economic system.
I  ■
have unskilled labor as their most abundant factor of . 
production. The surpluses of untrained and unskilled labor 
are found both in the rural and industrial sectors, but it
Henry M. Oliver, Jr., "The Economy of Ceylon," in 
Economic Systems of the commonwealth, ed. by Calvin B. 
Hoover (Durham: Duke University Press, 1962), p. 210.
74
is more obvious in the urban areas. Because of the high 
seasonality of work in the rural sector, nearly all of the 
laborers can be used during the peak work load periods. The 
underemployment is as widespread as unemployment for this 
reason. Workers are employed, but the amount of employment 
available is less than the desired amount.
In regard to the problem of labor. Western technology 
has often been more of a hindrance than a help.
Unfortunately, technological research has been 
carried on mainly in countries where labor is a 
relatively scarce factor. Technological progress 
is regarded as a synonym for labor-saving devices.
Little scientific endeavor has been directed toward 
raising production in countries where capital is 
scarce and labor abundant, and where consequently, 
labor-saving devices make little sense. No advanced 
technology has yet been discovered which is suited 
to the factor-proportions of underdeveloped 
countries.17
Paradoxically, while the surpluses are found in the 
labor sector, it is in just that sector that we see a real 
shortage. The need is for labor with any kinds of skills 
and training. The traditional system country has a dearth 
of professional, technical, and managerial people. Even 
craftsmen and low grade technicians are in short supply. 
Capital can be considered as both real capital and human 
capital. Investment in human capital is general education, 
special job skills, and training required to be an effective 
worker.
17Higgins, Economic Development, Principles,
Problems, and Policies, p. 258.
75
Prom this point of view, it may well .be, as 
Professor Kuzuets suggests, that instead of a 
difference in net capital formation proportions 
between 10 per cent in rich and, say, 3 per cent 
in poor countries, the true difference is closer 
to between 20 per cent or over and 3 per cent.18
The government as an institution in the traditional
system countries is not well established and political
instability is common.
Although central political rule— in one form or 
another— often existed in traditional societies, 
transcending the relatively self-sufficient regions, 
the centre of gravity of political power generally 
lay in the regions, in the hand of those who owned 
or controlled the land. The landowner maintained 
fluctuating but usually profound influence over 
such central political power as existed, backed 
by its entourage of civil servants and soldiers, 
imbued with attitudes and controlled by interests 
transcending the regions.19
The poor connection in terms of communication and transporta­
tion limits the extent to which the government can control 
the outlying regions. In addition, the poverty of the rural 
sector limits the interest which the government would have 
in these areas.
The government does provide some services in the 
traditional economic system, one of the primary services 
is found in the construction of an infrastructure. Roads 
and other forms of transportation are constructed along wijch 
communication systems in an effort to derive an economic 
gain of the raw material resources. Government participation
^®Meier, Simulation in Business and Economics, p. 268 
^^Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 6.
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has been greater in the areas of transportation and communi­
cation than in establishing networks of p o w e r . 20 These 
activities of government involve long range planning and 
investment which has proved troublesome since the payoff 
is not realized for years and also since the implementation 
of the plans are often hampered by the instability of the 
government.
Most countries have established a central bank; but 
this government agency is somewhat divorced from the com­
mercial banking system. In most countries the central banks 
lend less than 10 per cent of their loans to the commercial 
banks. The principal activity of the central banks consist 
in guiding the economy through suggestions and advice given 
to the commercial banks.
The institutions of the traditional economic system 
are found to be generally in keeping with the goals. The 
dichotomy is found in the technical and sociological dualism 
which splits the economy into the rural and industrial sec­
tors. The countries for which data was available that 
demonstrate the economic goals and institutions of the tra­
ditional economic system are Ceylon, Chile,. Colombia,
f.Dominican Republic, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Tunisia and 
Guatemala.
p. 447.
20Meier, simulation in Business and Economics,
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Classical Concepts of Communism 
Schwartz comments, "At the very outset, one is struck 
by a curious fact: for all the many decades of discussion
and propaganda about communism, nowhere is there any clear, 
simple and generally accepted blueprint explaining what a 
Communist society would be like. "̂  ̂ The purpose of this 
first portion on communism is to examine some of the concepts 
of classical communism. The transition stage of socialism 
as envisioned by Lenin and Marx will also be considered 
since the Communist nations still admit that they have not 
yet achieved full communism. If the classical writers did 
little to satisfy Harry Schwartz in their discussion of 
communism, they did even less in planning the transitional 
phase of socialism.
Marxist Economics
The goals of the early communist movement were goals 
of Utopia. The society was to develop to the supreme state 
of living and human intercourse where each member of society 
would give to the central storehouse according to his ability. 
The goal of a utopian society would be achieved through the 
removal of repression of the capitalists. In the provision 
of the utopian state, the two primary institutions which
^^Harry Schwartz, "What's Communism? Is It Being 
Achieved?" in The Soviet Crucible, ed. by Samuel Hendel 
(3rd ed.; Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967),
p. 377.
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the classical communists elucidated were the state and thb 
ownership of property.
The basis of the Marxist theory is the labor embodied 
theory of value which he used to show the disintegration of 
capitalism. Labor alone creates value, and the capitalist 
profit is derived from the surplus value created by labor. 
Since surplus value (profits) is created by exploitation 
through the use of capital, the competitive system would 
encourage the concentration of capital. The accumulation of 
capital in the form of labor-saving devices reduces the need 
for human resources. As one capitalist gains an advantage 
through more intensive use of capital, the competitive system 
forces other capitalists to also utilize more capital. The. 
unemployment resulting from this process forces wages down 
and leads to the increased misery of the workers and a larger 
portion of the labor force unemployed. The continuation of 
the process is dictated by the capitalist system. The in­
creased misery and unemployment will eventually result in a 
combined effort of the repressed to destroy the whole system.
The state was an instrument of the system and an 
instn:|ment of class oppression. However, Marx realized ^hat 
even a classless society would need an organization to dis­
charge the functions of maintaining order and providing 
services for the general welfare of society. He insisted 
that this would not be a State because he defined "State" 
as an instrument for oppression. The state would be replaced
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by an organization which he labeled "the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. " The dictatorship would serve the people 
as a protection against "counter-revolutionary" forces.
One other economic institution that is mentioned 
briefly in the writings of Marx is the labor force. The 
primary idea presented in this connection is that all would 
be required to work and since the profits would go to all of 
society through the state, no one would be exploited through 
the process of production. The only exception to this rule 
was the children, which Marx contended had been treated 
unfairly by the capitalist. The communist state would pro­
vide a free, universal education for all children in public 
schools.
Marx stated in the Communist Manifesto that the 
"theory of the Communists may be summed up in one sentence: 
Abolition of private property." The underlying idea was 
that property was owned and controlled by the capitalists 
and was being used by the bourgeoisie as a means of repression 
of the working people. Under communism all property would 
be owned by the people and used for all of the.people.
Capital is not a private good and is not to. be owned as
I ■private property, but it is a social good to be owned and 
controlled by society. Land, according to Marx, would be
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The Communist 
Manifesto," in Comparative Economic Systems: A Reader,
edited by Marshall I. Goldman (New York: Random House,
1964), p. 221.
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owned by the state, and the application of all rents on all 
lands would be put to public use. In order to protect 
society from the possibility of individual members accumu­
lating goods, a very progressive income tax would be imposed, 
and all rights of inheritance would be abolished.
Lenin* s Contributions to Marx
Lenin more firmly established the idea of the state 
as a necessary institution of the transition stage in the 
march to full communism. The state would be used to repress 
the small minority of the bourgeoisie. Lenin contends that 
this use of the state is necessary to provide the freedom 
promised by communism, only through the continuing protec­
tion of the masses from the bourgeoisie could true freedom 
be realized. Democracy was to be an integral part of the 
freedom provided under the communist rule. In the sense 
that the government was to be democratic, the state was not 
an institution to "govern" but the state was to be represen­
tative of the people and was designed simply to administer. 
Only after the establishment of the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" could democracy be established for the poor.
Although Lenin used the writings of Marx in an 
opportunistic sense, one should not fail to realize that 
he firmly believed in the Marxist ideology. Lenin added 
much to the Communist doctrine which is evident in modern 
communism. The theory of revolution and the role of the 
Communist Party are discussed as the major additions of Lenin.
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Lenin established the idea that the Communist Party 
was the vanguard of the working-class and was the organiza­
tion that could bring about revolution. As such, it was 
necessary that the party be united, working towards common 
goals. To maintain the working power of the party, it must 
constantly purge itself of the undesirable opportunistic 
elements. The party must be well disciplined and knowledge­
able of revolutionary theory with a political and economic 
program. The necessity for unification dictated that the 
party be centrally controlled during the period of revolution.
The spirit and enthusiasm of the younger communists 
was useful, but Lenin realized that the Communist Party must 
establish a base of power before revolution could be achieved. 
The "abstract communism" must be replaced through government 
organizations and labor unions to provide for the practical 
mass political action. The drive for power could not be met 
merely through agitation and propaganda, but would require 
a most difficult form of compromise. While adhering strictly 
to communist doctrine, the practical compromises must be 
accepted when these could provide the basis of attracting 
the support of the large population which would make revolu-
I •tion a reality. Workers were encouraged to assist by working 
within the trade unions while others worked in political 
organizations.
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Stalin* s Contributions 
to Marxist Theory
Stalin's greatest contribution to Marxist theory 
was his doctrine of socialism in one country. The theory 
was established on an idea of Lenin which stated that unequal 
development was characteristic of capitalism. The necessity 
of establishing the doctrine was evident to Stalin as he 
saw the capitalist power surrounding Russia leaving little 
hope for including Western Europe in the revolution at that 
time. The defense of the Soviet Union and the need for 
support from the peasants required collectivization. 
Socialism could succeed only by establishing the security 
of the "new order. " However, once the strength is estab­
lished# Stalin contended that the communist movement would 
continue as other countries could be freed from the chains 
of capitalist imperialism.
In addition to socialism in one country, Stalin 
rationalized the maintenance of the state in the transition 
period of authoritarian Socialism. The argument was again 
one of strength and protection. As long as the capitalists 
have power, the communists must have the services of the 
state^to assure that the communist movement could continue. 
Within the country the state was to provide for cultural 
and economic organization, but the armed services were 




After the terror of the purges and. the war years, 
the emphasis was placed on collective leadership. The 
"cult of personality" was condemned by Khrushchev, and he 
proposed a collective leadership of the government. While 
proposing the idea of collective leadership, he was managing 
to gain the power which was necessary for him to emerge as 
the leader of the Soviet Union.
The doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" is perhaps 
Khrushchev ' s most important to the Marxist theory. He felt 
that the stage had been reached where the competition 
between the communists and capitalists could be realized 
without the necessity of military force. By evaluating the 
economic success of both systems, Khrushchev contended that 
the communist system would best develop the productive use 
of capital and labor. The evidence would be convincing to 
the degree that the necessity of military conflict could be 
eliminated.
The primary institution of the communist economy 
which was not described by Marx and the others was the 
communist price system. This, as is indicated in the dis­
cussion of modern communism, has beerr a problem that is very 
much evident today. Even in the transitional state of 
socialism, the requirement of central planning and resource 




An inçjortant question is what, if any, has been and 
continues to be the significance of Marxist theory 
for an understanding of the Soviet system. The 
fact is that, although far-reaching changes have 
occurred in the U.S.S.R. since the death of Stalin 
there has been little reconsideration of the con­
ception, long and generally favored in the West, 
that however variously Soviet history may be 
explained or appraised, commitment to Marxist theory 
on the part of Soviet leaders forms little or no 
relevant part of that explanation or a p p r a i s a l .
Although the polycentric power structure of modern 
communism makes it impossible to categorize all communist 
countries, "the Soviet economy is the prototype of the 
economies of the communist-bloc nations. In the follow­
ing discussion of the goals and institutions of modern 
communism, the Soviet economy will be used primarily with
I • 'reference to the distinguishing features of the other
economies. The polycentrism is more that of political
alignment than of the economic system.
"In the Soviet view, technological progress is not
only virtually synonymous with human progress, but it is
also an overriding national goal and a major element of
25legitimation of Communist rule in Russia. " The goal of
Samuel Hendel, "The Role of Theory, " in The Soviet 
Crucible, ed. by Samuel Hendel (3rd ed.; Princeton: D. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957), p. 408.
2^Allan G. Gruchy, Comparative Economic Systems 
(Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 605.
Gregory Grossman, "Innovation and Information 
in the Soviet Economy," American Economic Association 
Papers and Proceedings, LVI (May, 1966), 118.
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technological progress is used as the reason for many actions 
by the State, eig. the dearth of consumer goods within the 
economy. In addition technological progress is seen as the 
means of increasing the power of Communism in the world 
community and eventually of alleviating poverty in the 
Communist world.
The technological interest has been primarily in 
the area of heavy industry in an effort to build a strong 
industrial basis for the communist system. Stalin empha­
sized heavy industry nearly to the exclusion of all other 
sectors. His heirs, however, have given more attention to 
light industry and agriculture providing more for the con­
sumers in order to gain populous support. Even today heavy 
industry still gets top priority because it is only through 
a large industrial system that the goals of communism can 
be reached.
The goals of technology and broad based industriali­
zation might be seen as sub-goals of the primary goal of 
communism. "The political system of the Soviet Union is
designed to give the executive a maximum of power for the
26purpose of effecting an economic transformation." The
utilization of the economic transformation for the retention 
of power appears to be omnipresent. The preservation of 
power for the communist nations, the Communist Party, and
26Carl Landauer, Contemporary Economic Systems, A 
Comparative Analysis (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott 
Company, 1964), p. 421.
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the leaders is one of the goals present throughout communist 
history. Khruschchev felt that the power of the communist 
bloc nations was firmly entrenched and felt that this could 
be maintained with a policy of "peaceful coexistence," but 
indicated that any means that were necessary would be used 
to maintain this position of power. He justified the theory 
by maintaining that the superiority of the communist system 
over the capitalist system would be evident. The class 
struggle would not be eliminated, but it would not neces­
sarily be violent. In addition to the external preservation 
of power, the Communist Party is organized to provide for 
the preservation of the power of the executive leaders with­
in the system. The Communist Party utilizes their inter­
pretation of the Marxist idology as their justification for 
actions and the retention of power. Most economic actions 
and institutions in the Soviet government are established 
with these goals in the center of the plans.
In the examination of the market system found under 
the rule of communism, one finds it helpful to divide the 
market into the producer goods sector and the consumer 
goods sector. "Prices for producer goods are administra­
tively set (or, at least, approved) according to complicated 
principles and procedures which may have their rationale but
in any case do not purport to seek either scarcity or equi-
27librium levels." Prices, however, are not the only
^^Grossman, "Innovation and Information," p. 119.
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consideration of the market for producers goods. One may 
not buy producers goods without an allocation which is 
given by the central planning authorities. The allocation 
is often the overriding element of exchange, with prices 
playing a secondary role. In the case of producers goods, 
the price system is irrational because the price does not 
adequately represent real cost and yields an inefficient 
allocation of resources. For day-to-day production deci­
sions, the most important economic information consists of 
plan targets, supply allocations, and success indicators.
The Soviet Union has established a somewhat similar 
market in the area of Consumers Market. It has, however, 
maintained an open market in most cases. Some goods, for 
example health and education, are distributed in the form 
of free communal consumption. For other goods most prices 
are established by the government at two levels of distribu­
tion. The retail price is set at approximately twice the 
wholesale price. The difference between the two prices is 
composed of distribution costs, a small amount of planned 
profit, and a turnover tax.
TTye size of the turnover tax suggests that almost \
half of the retail price of most goods is unre­
lated to cost. The purpose of the turnover tax 
appears to be twofold: (1) to accumulate money
for government expenditures, a function of most 
taxes; (2) to serve as an instrument for regulatingdemand.28
^®Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Marketing (Glencoe, 
Illinois: The Free Press, 1963), p. 86.
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In the consumers markets, the two basic categories 
of retail outlets are the government owned and operated 
stores and the farmer's markets (Kolkhoz). The government 
controlled outlets are divided into the government stores 
and the consumer cooperatives. One should not be misled by 
nomenclature because the two types are essentially the 
same. Government stores are more predominant in the larger 
cities and are the larger outlets. Although the consumers 
cooperatives are controlled by another bureaucratic network, 
both types are completely regulated by the Ministry of Trade.
The farmer's markets (Kolkhoz) is a free market in
which excess produce is brought to the villages. While the
government purchases almost all of the farm produce, the
workers are allowed to market the remainder. The kolkhoz
29markets sell less than 10 per cent of the retail markets, 
and the past two decades have seen a decline in the impor­
tance of this free trade. However, the Kolkhoz provides an 
importance source of produce in the rural areas.
professor Bergson^® contends that the price system 
is nondiscriminatory. There is a form of discrimination in 
the prices between the rural and the urban markets with
i '
prices being somewhat lower in the latter. Also, the prices 
in the government store seem somewhat lower than in the
^^Ibid., p. 45.
^^Abram Bergson, The Economics of Soviet Planning 
(New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1964), p. 67
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consumers cooperatives. The price system does violate the 
efficiency rule that the prices be set at clearing levels. 
The communist price levels have remained static except in 
certain instances where a price reduction is allowed to 
move accumulated goods and when general price changes are 
effected, with the introduction of the Liberman proposals 
discussed below# the wholesale and retail prices were changed 
on a mass scale in the late I960's.
The markets of the Soviet Union require an extensive
planning apparatus to function as an allocator of resources.
The Soviet national planning apparatus is best 
conceived of as a hierarchical pyramid at the 
apex of which is (1965) the U.S.S.R. Supreme 
Economic Council. Below this top planning organi­
zation, the planning apparatus broadens through a 
number of 'staff' and 'line' administrative layers 
at the national, republic, regional, provincial, 
district, city, and local levels. At each lower 
level, the planning activity is spread over a 
larger number of planning organizations until the 
bottom of the hierarchical pyramid is reached, 
where are found the planning departments of many 
thousands of operating plants and other 
establishments.
A detailed analysis of the planning apparatus is beyond the 
scope of this study, but one should note a few implications 
of the economic system.
The planners of the Soviet Union looked to the 
capitalist countries for techniques of planning after the 
death of Stalin. One of the most important contributions 
to Planning was input-output analysis originally developed
^^Gruchy, Comparative Economic Systems, p= 653,
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by Wassily Leontief. The increasingly complex interrela­
tionships of resource need and supply in the Soviet Union 
have been simplified to an extent by the construction of 
input-output plans. The input-output table shows the 
technical relationships between the resources necessary to 
produce the required output. Since these relationships are 
constructed on present technology, they are evolving, but 
remain relatively stable. Because of the necessary inter­
dependence, plans constructed by input-output analysis assume 
that the inputs required will be forthcoming. Changes in 
either available input or required output necessitates a 
reformulation of the input-output plan. Equilibrium is 
therefore the basic requirement of the mathematical 
technique.
The Russians have prepared a succession of 
input-output tables of increasing size and 
refinement. The latest stage in their experimen­
tation is to use the input-output table to 
generate the levels of output and its allocation 
implicit in the plan targets for some future year 
and then to check these against the plan worked 
out in the actual planning process. The results 
are said to be encouragingly close but the Russians 
are apparently not yet willing to trust actual 
operational planning to the computer.32
 ̂ The Soviet planning system is designed to solve l̂ he 
same basic economic problems the capitalist price system 
solves:— what to produce, in what ways, and for whom. The 
two basic types of plans are long term plans of five, seven,
3?Robert W. Campbell, Soviet Economic Power; Its 
Organization, Growth, and Challenge (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 50-51.
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or more years and the current or annual plans. The long 
term plans are goal oriented, and the annual plans are 
operation oriented. Planning is a continuous process 
covering all areas of economic activity; but, in keeping 
with the communist goals, heavy emphasis is placed on indi­
vidual plans.
The Soviet approach to short-term (output) 
and long-term (expansion) planning is predomi­
nantly technical. It implies
1) Direct determination by the policy makers 
of both final outputs and some key intermediate 
products in physical terms.
2) Quantitative explanation of the production 
functions and gradation of technical efficiency
of the available plants.
3) Direct allocation of scarce resources in 
relation to the selected output and expansion 
targets.
4) Reliance on a whole set of commands con­
cerning investment, outputs, procurement, wage 
levels, and use of variously adjusted prices in 
order to reinforce the physical technical pro­
visions of the plan.
5) Utilization of market mechanisms for 
deploying labor according to the plan and for the 
distribution of consumers' goods.
6) Loose coordination between the set of 
physical balances concerning a variety of products 
and the monetary balances concerning certain 
macroeconomic magnitudes, such as investment and 
the income and expenditures of the population.33
Planning is a necessary and central part of the 
communist economic system. The plans utilize an enormous
/ ■amount of statistics, which in the past have been unreliable 
and have produced unwieldy models. One has seen the evidence
33Nicholas Spulber, The Soviet Economy, Structure, 
Principles, Problems (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
Inc., 1962), pp. 47-48.
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of some changes in the system of planning, and the Liberman 
proposals are an integral part of the recent changes.
The potentialities and possibilities available in 
mass standardization have always been regarded as a great 
source of economic efficiency to the true theorists. Effi­
ciencies could be realized because time and energy would not 
have to be wasted with such mundane activities as model 
changes or other changes merely used for consumer satisfac­
tion but which did not add to the efficiency or operation 
of the item. The production methods could be perfected, and 
the optimum mix of the factors of production could be realized 
with the proper use of the scientist and engineer. "It was 
not exactly surprising, therefore, to find that the Russians 
did in fact begin to excel in many fields of production and 
that output increased rapidly, especially in those areas like 
steel production, to which they decided to devote their chief 
attention.
In the 1950's the Soviet economy, having recovered, 
from the effects of World War II, seemed to prove that the 
theorists were correct regarding the potentialities of mass 
standardization made possible with centralized planning.
I  *
"Gross national product increased at an average annual rate 
of about 7 per cent, and industrial output rose more than
^^Marshall I. Goldman, "The Economy at the Crossroads, " 
Survey (October, 1955), p. 126.
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10 per cent annually. The migration of the workers from 
the rural areas to industrial centers greatly increased the 
labor productivity and industrial output. The growth age 
of the 1950's came to somewhat of an abrupt halt at the turn 
of the decade. Part of the abruptness of the halt was due 
to the weighting system used in the statistics which exag­
gerated the growth. Also, the improvement in quality of 
recent years cannot be given adequate attention in the con­
verted use of statistics. But there were much more basic 
reasons for the slowdown. "The Soviet Union suffered from 
exhaustion of easily-accessible or already-existing resources 
of minerals, timber, and transport."̂ 6 To expand to other 
resources, large investments would be needed in the infra­
structure. Another reason is the fact that the attention 
was changing from the industries of steel and coal to more 
exotic industries such as nonferrous metals, plastics, 
petroleum, electronics and chemicals. These newer indus­
tries could not Utilize effectively the apparatus designed 
for mass standardization and centralized planning.
As the economy becomes increasingly more complex,
the pĴ anning function itself becomes somewhat unwieldy. ^
In brief, the Soviet economy today faces an enormous 
organizational and institutional problem, the prob­
lem of finding a workable degree of centralization
j ^^Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Economic 'Reforms';
A Study in Contradictions," Soviet Studies (July, 1968), p. 2.
^^Alec Nove, Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev, p. 80.
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(or decentralization) under new and changing 
conditions . . . The sheer bulk of the planning 
job, as it is now carried on in the Soviet Union 
can be mathematically likened to the square of 
the number of commodities plus the square of the 
number of economic units. As both products and 
producing units multiply with the economy's 
growth, the task of planning swells much faster.3'
Not only the mechanics of the planning process has 
come under fire, but also the indicators that are emphasized 
by the Soviets. The fulfillment of the output target re­
ceived primary emphasis, with the managers who are able to 
meet or surpass the output plans getting the rewards of the 
system. According to Harry G. Shaffer this particular 
system has several shortcomings.^® With the emphasis being 
placed on output, there is a tendency to hide and hold in 
reserve the true productive capacity of the plant. In addi­
tion, because of the need for capital, a "good" manager will 
try to get as much as possible and will produce those goods 
which will help him fulfill his output plan without the 
attention being given to the quality and usefulness of the 
commodity. Even Khrushchev brought this out when he vividly 
described the abuses of the plan in 1959.
It has become the tradition to produce not beautiful 
chandeliers to adorn homes, but the heaviest chan­
deliers possible. This is because the heavier the 
chandeliers produced, the more a factory gets since 
its output is calculated in tons. So the factories
Gregory Grossman, "The Soviet Economy, " Problems 
of Communism (March-April, 1963), p. 41.
^®Harry G. Shaffer, "What Price Economic Reforms?" 
Problems of Communism (May-June, 1963), pp. 19-21.
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make chandeliers weighing hundreds of kilograms 
and fulfill the plan. But who needs such a plan?^?
In addition to producing the wrong goods# the Soviet econo­
mist Professor Yevsei Liberman felt this "incentive-system 
. . . is a direct impediment to increasing product quality 
or mastering new products.
When the slowdown occurred in the Soviet economy# 
the leaders started trying to correct the ills. The "output 
incentive" had been under attack by the Soviet economists 
for some time. There were several economists suggesting 
reforms# but for this paper only one economist will be con­
sidered. He is professor Yevsei Liberman# the economist 
whose name gave the title "Libermanism" to the reform school 
of economists. Liberman started writing about the reforms 
as early as 1948# and during the strong economy of the 1950's 
was predicting a slowdown due to sectorial shifts which 
finally occurred# but he was able to get his writings recog­
nized only after the trouble occurred. Probably his most 
meaningful article was "Enterprise Profits as Basis for 
Incentive Payments" in Pravda# September 9# 1952# in which 
he outlined his primary proposals for reform.
Liberman is interested in solving one of the majoré 
problems set forth in the Party Program. This problem he
^^Harry Schwartz# The Soviet Economy Since Stalin# ■
p. 141.
^^Yevsei Liberman# "Enterprise Profits as Basis for 
Incentive Payments#" The current Digest of the Soviet Press 
(October 3# 1962)# p. 14.
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sees as "the formation of a system of planning and assessing 
the work of enterprises so that they have a vital interest 
in higher plan assignments, in the introduction of new 
technology and in improving the quality of output - in a 
word, in achieving the greatest production efficiency.
One should note here that what he was interested in was a 
plan that would cure the ills of the old planning system.
A new plan would call for improved technology and would be 
more compatible with the more modern industries of elec­
tronics and chemicals.
The plan which he proposed still involved the party's 
assigning output requirements and assortments or mix of the 
products. At this point the enterprise would receive a 
certain amount of autonomy in that the decision as how to 
meet the output requirements. "On the basis of volume and 
assortment assignments they receive, the enterprises them­
selves should draw up the final plan, covering labor pro­
ductivity and number of workers, wages, production costs, 
accumulations, capital investments, and new technology. 
instead of output being the index upon which incentive is
based, profitability now comes to the front as the primary.
hindex on which incentive would be based.
What this means is that the more profitability shown 
by the enterprise, the greater would be the incentive paid •
.42
^^Ibid., p. 13. 
^^Ibid.
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by the party. For example, if profitability went up by a 
factor of ten, then the incentive might be doubled. This 
example shows that much of the increased profit would go to 
the Party, but some would be used as an incentive for the 
company. According to the Liberman proposal, the company 
would receive incentive based on the plan which it sets up. 
If they do not reach the planned objective, the incentive 
would be based on the amount of profit actually realized, 
but if the profitability was greater than the set objective, 
the incentive would be based on the profit half-way between 
the objective and the profit realized, thus encouraging the 
setting of a high objective.
"The best general yardstick of efficiency to choose 
would be profitability, in the form of a percentage of capi­
tal. Why? Because this is the most complex standard of 
measurement."^^ This type of plan would make it necessary 
for the enterprise to make the best possible use of the 
factors of production— land, labor, capital, and entrepre­
neurship. Excess capital equipment and labor would lower 
profits, and these are the things which were being requested
under the old planning system. Also, enterprises would not
I ■be so eager and devote so much attention to trying to lower 
the output requirements. The lowering of output would in 
general lower the firm's potential for making profits.
Yevsei Liberman, "Liberman's Reply to Critics of 
Profits Proposal," The current Digest of the Soviet press, 
December 5, 1952, p. 17.
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Again, one of the shortcomings of the output incentive plan 
would be eliminated.
Liberman further asserts that his proposed plan 
would relieve the administration of the centralized planning 
from "the petty tutelage over enterprises." Under his plan, 
economic measures would be substituted for the more costly 
and less effective ones which are purely administrative.
Firms would not have a chance to concentrate on 
those items which are the most profitable because no incen­
tive pay would be given unless the required output and 
assortment is provided. Also, new products would be en­
couraged by additions to or reductions to incentives based 
on the relative amount of new products and new technology 
incorporated in the firm.
One should be careful not to identify the Liberman
plan with capitalism. Liberman was very careful to make
sure that people did not misunderstand his use of profits
in the Soviet system.
Some economists say that profit should not be made 
too conspicuous, that this is supposedly a capi­
talist index. This is not so! Our profit has 
nothing in common with capitalist profit. Our 
profits . . . is the result and at the same the ^
measure (in monetary terms) of the actual effec­
tiveness of labor expenditures.44
The profits are created not for the good of the management,
but, as under capitalism, are to be returned to the owners
Yevsei Liberman, "Enterprise Profits as Basis for , 
Incentive Payments," The Current Digest of the Soviet press, 
October 3, 1962, p. 14.
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of the capital. Naturally, in the Soviet Union, profits 
are created for the benefit of the masses. "Profitability 
of Soviet enterprises is their ability to yield a net income 
for society, and it is, therefore, a qualitative index, and 
its measure can be only a relative value.
Economic Reforms in Practice 
The debate went on among the economists for several 
years. "Finally, a cautious but perhaps a desperate 
Khrushchev decided to permit tryouts of some of the propo- 
sals in a non-priority sector of the economy." The try­
outs began on a small scale with two large clothing firms 
being selected for the experiment in 1964. The new rules 
established a great degree of freedom for the managers to 
operate the plants in a way which they felt would be the 
best manner to meet the new success criterion. As suggested 
under the Liberman proposal, output and assortment mix were 
established by the party leaders, but profitability was set 
as the measure for success. The experiment was widened in 
1965, as approximately 400 consumer goods firms and their 
supplies as well as a few plants in other industries were 
added^to the experimental firms.’ ^
Although the firms met with the expected problems of 
implementing new methods and measurements, a degree of
^^Yevsei Liberman, "Profit as the Servant of Commu­
nism, " in The Soviet Crucible, ed. by Samuel Hendel, p. 340.
^^Schroeder, "Soviet Economic 'Reforms,'" p. 3.
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success was obtained. Enough success was obtained that in 
September of 1965 at Party Plenum Premier Kosygin proposed 
a sweeping series of reforms to be introduced on a gradual 
basis, but to be completed by 1968 in the industrial sector.
Several major provisions for -the reform were set 
forward in the conference. First, the.regional economic 
councils were replaced with 23 industrial ministries. The 
enterprises, as had been suggested in the Liberman proposal, 
were given a larger share of the planning function. Before 
the Party Plenum, there were some 35 to 40 key indicators, 
but all of these except eight were turned over to the enter­
prises. The eight remaining in the hands of the central 
planners are physical output of the principal products, 
sales, profits and profitability, wage fund, payments into 
the state budget, capital investment from centralized funds, 
tasks for the introduction of new technology, and material 
supplies. The third provision adopted was the heart of the 
Liberman proposal. The output incentive was replaced with 
profits and profitability for measurement of success of an 
enterprise and as a basis for determining the bonuses which 
are to be paid for good management. Also, a charge was intro­
duced for the use of invested capital. Finally, it was 
stipulated that the reform of industrial prices which had 
been in process for some time would be completed.
^^Ibid., p. 4.
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In a speech^® regarding the economic reforms/
Kosygin first described the achievements of the Soviet
successes in electronics, metallurgy, chemicals and other
modern fields. Weaknesses of the economy were pointed out
as being temporary, but the planning procedures were in need
of study, and revision, according to the Premier.
The forms of industrial management, planning and 
incentive now in effect no longer conform to 
present-day technical-economic conditions and to 
the level of development of production forces.
The economic initiative and rights of enterprises 
are constricted, and they have insufficient 
responsibility.^^
The resolution coming out of Plenary session of the
C. P. S. Ü. Central Committee seemed in many cases to be a
simple repeat of the Kosygin speech.
This (economic reform) ensures further expansion 
of democratic principles of management, creates 
the economic prerequisites for the broader 
participation of the masses in the management of 
production and their influence on the results of 
the economic work of enterprises,
The anticipation which followed the adoption of 
these proposals was somewhat greater than the implementation. 
The instructions regarding the reform were started in the 
early part of 1966. In reality 1965 was an extension of the 
experiments started in 1964. It was not until early 1967
4 ,0Kosygin, "Kosygin Speaks to 23rd Congress," Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press, October 13, 1965, p. 6.
i ^ ^ Ih id .
p. s. U. - Central Committee, "Resolutions on , 
Industrial Management, 23rd Congress," The current Digest 
of the Soviet Press, October 13, 1965, p. 16.
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that the first complete Ministry was converted, Now/ the 
timetable calls for "the main part" of the industrial sector 
to be completed in 1968.
In the area of price changes, the timetable has been 
followed more closely. The prices for consumer goods were 
established in late 1966 and early 1967 with the heavy indus­
trial prices some six months later. The resulting change in 
the wholesale price index was an increase of approximately 
8 per cent.
One thing to note about the implementation of the 
reform is that any modifications made in the original ideas 
have been in the direction of being less liberal. In dis­
cussing the political aspect of the reform, C, Olgin attaches 
the label of "pessimist" to those who feel the reform will 
involve no change and the label of "optimist" to those who 
believe in the reform, thinking that there will be real 
structural changes in the planning process. He brings out 
that even in the U, S. S. R. there are nearly an equal 
number of the "optimists" and "pessimists," "The actual 
information on the implementation of the reform tends in
itself, at first sight to support the 'pessimists' rather
m  !■than the 'optimists,'"
There are already several real improvements which 
have come with the implementation of the reform. The number
Olgin, "The 'Economic Reform': The Political
Aspect," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of USSR, 
November, 1967, p. 13.
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of indices has been reduced, interest for capital has been 
incorporated, more material incentives are being used, and 
the prices being used are certainly an improvement.
Down to the present, however, the scope of the re­
forms has been somewhat limited. The implementation has 
been a tight rope walk between economic and political feasi­
bility. The power of the central planners has not yet been 
reduced exemplifying the fact that the bureaucracy surrenders 
power reluctantly in any country.
The labor market, as indicated above, is not as 
structured or planned as the markets for consumer or producer 
goods (a major exception being that the mobility of collec­
tive farmers is administratively restricted).
'At one time there was much that was compulsory; 
laborers were drafted for work and not allowed 
to shift employment without permission. This 
labor draft, however, was primarily a wartime 
measure - although unfortunately for the Soviet 
worker, there were some officials in the U. S. S. R. 
who did not realize that the war had ended until 
after Stalin died in 1953. Soviet citizens are 
still required to carry labor workbooks and internal 
passports, but compulsory job assignment was ulti­
mately abolished in 1956. There is now considerable 
labor mobility in the Soviet Union. In fact, a 
persistent complaint in that there is too m u c h . ^ 2
 ̂ Although the communist worker is given the choic^ as 
to what type of work he will do, he is influenced by a num­
ber of factors. The education and training for many positions 
is limited to a select group of people. In addition material
^^Marshall I. Goldman, Comparative Economic Systems,
p. 412.
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incentives are used to increase the number of workers flow­
ing into jobs where there is a critical shortage.
As a result of the labor policy in the Soviet Union, 
there has been and continues to be a large migration to the 
urban areas, and the number of skilled and highly skilled 
employees continues to increase. More emphasis is placed 
on the "non-productive" fields of science, education, health, 
culture and similar fields as the planners recognize the 
increasing importance of these areas to economic growth.
Labor production is increasing quite rapidly, and the parti­
cipation in the labor force, including women, remains quite 
high as the concept of "socially useful labor" remains a 
central point of focus in Soviet labor policy.
' The communist property structure, unlike the labor 
force, is not couched in anything resembling a free market. 
The core of the property structure is the state or public 
sector in which are found all of the major state-owned and 
state-operated industry. This large inner core contains 
mining, heavy industry, communications, power, construction, 
retail stores in the cities, and the large state farms. 
Surrounding the public sector is a sizable area of coopeâ a- 
tive enterprise which includes the collective farms and the 
producers' and consumers' cooperatives. The private property 
is restricted to the activities of individual artisans or 
craftsmen, individual peasants who own small farms in the
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very remote regions. The large state sector is growing at 
the expense of both the private and cooperative sector.
The role of the government in the communist economic 
system has already demonstrated its importance and active 
participation in the determination of.the markets, labor, 
and property. The fact that the Soviet and other communist 
states operate authoritatively is evident in almost every 
aspect of economic life. Strict discipline and absolute 
authority of the state are established through the means of 
the Communist Party, which was first established as a 
revolutionary class party, but is now more concerned with 
administration. The power over the political and economic 
forces resides in the party, and the party permeates all 
government and economic institutions.
The most active and politically-conscious 
citizens in the ranks of the working class, 
working peasants and working intelligentsia 
voluntarily unite in the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, which is the vanguard of the working 
people in this struggle to build communist society 
and is the leading core of all organizations of 
the working people, both government and non­
government .
The Communist Party overrides any notion of democracy 
as the party is centrally controlled and is seen as the only 
representative of the people. Although "democratic voting" 
is provided, ballots contain only one name for each position.
^^The Constitution of the U. S. S. R., Article 126, 
in The Soviet Crucible, ed. by Samuel Hendel, p. 431.
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The purpose of the Communist Party is not representation,
but of providing cohesion. As the implementation agent of
the Marxist ideology, the Party provides a rationalizing
force. Niles Hansen contends that this is quite similar to
the concept of Weber's Protestant ethic.
Thus, although the Communist.and capitalist systems 
are externally different, each has required a 
religious (or ideological) component to motivate 
methodical, rational application of human means 
towards economic ends; and the effects of the 
metaphysical orientation have been quite similar.
Since 1956 the government of communism has gone 
through several transitions. First, the governments have 
ejqjerienced a general rise of expectations from the people 
which it governs, and the people have been given some more, 
especially in terms of consumer goods. Secondly, there has 
been a generally declining interest in the use of Marxist- 
Leninist ideology. Finally, the Soviet domination of world 
communism has given away to a polycentric pattern of power, 
which power in larger amounts to Communist countries other 
than the Soviet Union.
Niles Hansen, "The Protestant Ethic as a General 
Precondition for Economic Development," Canadian Journal 
of Economic and Political Science, XXIX, No. 4 (Nov., 1963), 
471.
CHAPTER V 
THE TYPIFICATION MODELS 
Introduction
From the study of the goals and institutions of the 
four economic systems presented in Chapters III and IV, one 
can construct the typification models which summarize the 
core features of each economic system. The purpose of the 
present chapter is to present a concise statement of the 
core features of each system and to analyze the models to 
determine the a priori expectations of economic performance 
as measured by growth and price stability. The typification 
models should suggest what results can be expected from the 
statistical analysis of the data.
The typification models are constructed as represen­
tative of the typical economy described by the system. The 
essential features of each economic system are derived from 
the study of the economic system. No attempt is made to /■ 
describe any one manifestation of the economic system as 
produced by a single country, but the core features are both 
theoretical and realistic interpretations of the goals and 




The goals of a typical capitalist system are pri­
marily based on individual freedom. Freedom is stressed 
in all of the institutions, and economic freedom is provided 
through good performance of growth and price stability. The 
goals are expressed by the government's acceptance of the 
responsibility of providing an atmosphere conducive to real 
economic growth, price stability, full employment, and a 
favorable balance of international payments. Innovation 
plays an important role, and a minimum level of economic 
security is the goal for each individual.
The property structure is a mixture of the large 
corporation in which management is separated from ownership 
and a larger private property structure composed of individual 
entrepreneurs. The functions of government require govern­
ment ownership in those areas not served by the private 
sector. Although most of the property is held by individuals, 
the large corporations dominate the markets with less and 
less emphasis on price competition. The market for both 
consumer goods and producer goods is free and open. The
labor market in the typical capitalist country is free with
I  ■large labor organizations. The commercial instruments and 
financial market is well developed to facilitate the corpo­
rate structure. The government institution provides the 
traditional functions of defense, maintaining order within 
the country, and providing education. The additional
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responsibilities associated with "mixed capitalism" include 
providing for growth and stability in the economy and a 
minimum level of economic security for each individual.
Democratic Socialism
The goals of democratic socialism stress providing 
for social welfare. The freedom of the individual is ob­
tained by securing adequate economic resources for each and 
every individual. To provide for the greatest amount of 
social welfare, the typical socialist society emphasizes a 
goal of steady economic growth with price stability.
The property structure of democratic socialism is 
one designed to produce the greatest amount of social wel­
fare while preserving the economic and political freedom 
of the individual. In the typical socialist country the 
primary industries of production, transportation and communi­
cation, and finance are nationalized. Private property 
prevails in all other areas of enterprise. The functions of 
the socialist government extend beyond the traditional areas 
to include the ownership and management of nationalized 
industry and the provision of economic security for all 
people. The latter includes social welfare programs such 
as health and education. The government is charged with the 
responsibility of directing the economy towards good economic 
performance. In an effort to maintain high social welfare, 
the government endeavors to redistribute income through
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taxation. The work order is essentially well organized in 
strong labor unions. A large portion of the labor force is 
represented by centralized national labor unions.
Traditionalist System
The goals typical of the traditionalist system are 
oriented to the maintenance of the status quo. However, one 
finds that the goals evident in the traditional system are 
dependent on the class structure. The elite can realize a 
goal of individual profit even in a status quo oriented 
society. Small land owners exemplify a goal of independence 
for themselves and a better life for future generations. 
However, the majority of the population are typically land­
less peasants dependent on a large landowner. For these, the 
only goal recognizable is one of preserving the status quo.
An essential feature of the traditionalist system 
is the presence of a dual sector. In addition to the un­
developed economy, an advanced industrial sector is found, 
primarily in the urban areas. This advanced sector may be 
capitalist, socialist, communist, or a mixture of these.
The dual sector gives rise to a three sector market. The 
urban market, the rural market, and the international markets 
reflect the influence of the developed economy imported from 
advanced, foreign countries. The rural market is typified 
by the village market characterized by competitive bargain­
ing and the landowner's store characterized by the monopoly 
power of the landowner.
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class structure dominates the property structure, 
the work force, and the government institutions. Property 
is generally held in either very large plantations or very 
small plots. The large landowners use tenant farmers or 
peasants as labor on the plantations.- These tenant farmers 
typically are living at a subsistence level while the 
independent farmers who own but a few acres seldom have a 
much higher income, A core feature of the traditionalist 
system is the lack of skills and training of the work force. 
The large landowners also dominate the government which is 
principally regional with the central government politically 
unstable and unsuccessful in providing the infrastructure 
necessary for economic development.
Communism
The goals of communism can be summarized as a con­
tinuing struggle for power. The striving for power is mani­
fested in a goal for communist domination of the world, a 
goal of the various countries to gain control of the communist 
world, and a goal of each communist leader to gain more 
personal power. The communist doctrine stresses technologi­
cal progress and industrialization as the means to achieve 
the communist goals.
The institutional framework is designed to achieve 
these goals and is dominated by the state. The goods in 
the industrial market are produced by state firms to be 
sold to state firms. Consumer goods are marketed through
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state owned and operated stores at prices established by 
the state. The established prices are not designed to reach 
an equilibrium level of supply and demand but to produce an 
allocation of goods in keeping with the sophisticated eco­
nomic plans. All property with minor-exceptions, is con­
trolled and owned by the state, and labor is generally allo­
cated to meet the demands of the state. The Communist Party 
maintains the power of the government institutions and is 
the central economic and political power of the communist 
system. The state serves the traditional functions of 
government, but is more concerned with providing the alloca­
tion of resources and energies to achieve the goals of the 
communist society in the most expedient manner.
A Priori Expectations
The typifications suggest certain expectations of 
the statistical analysis regarding performance as measured 
by growth and inflation. The purpose of the present section 
is to derive a priori inference from the goals and institu­
tions of the various economic systems. This section can 
examine what performances should be indicated by the ex­
pressed goals of the system while the following chapter will 
measure the attainment of the goals by actual, historical 
performance.
The capitalist, socialist, and communist systems 
all have an expressed goal of economic growth. The emphasis 
placed on growth by the capitalist and socialist countries
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is similar. These two systems blend the goal of economic 
growth with a goal of preserving the freedom of the indi­
vidual. In addition more attention is given to consumer 
goods than in the countries of the communist system. Because 
of these factors one would expect the growth performance 
demonstrated by capitalism and socialism to be much the 
same. The goal of providing for heavy industry and large 
capital formation in the communist countries to the exclusion 
of large amounts of consumer goods should produce a different 
result. A larger amount of growth should be expected in the 
measures of production and income.
The goals and institutions of the traditonal system 
would suggest very limited growth if any. The fatalistic 
acceptance of present economic conditions limits the energy 
expended to provide for growth. Also, the subsistence level 
of living in the traditional countries eliminates the possi­
bility of the large savings required for capital expansion 
necessary to provide economic growth. This, along with 
limited capital and an almost non-existent infrastructure, 
would indicate a very low growth rate in the traditional 
countries.
/■From the typification models, one can also derive 
a priori expectations of the ratio of capital investment to 
gross domestic product. The communist system's goal of 
industrialization, even to the exclusion of consumption, 
would indicate the largest ratio of capital to production.
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On the other extreme, the traditionalist countries should 
exhibit the smallest ratio since little savings can be 
generated to produce capital. One would expect the ratios 
of the capitalist and socialist systems to be similar because 
both systems are typified by developed countries. The goals 
of both of these systems stress economic growth but not to 
the exclusion of individual freedom. Therefore, one would 
predict that the amount of production utilized for capital 
development in the capitalist and socialist countries would 
be greater than the traditional countries but not as large 
as that of the communist countries.
One can also derive a priori expectations from 
typification concerning the amount of gross domestic product 
derived from private consumption. The private consumption 
ratio should delineate between the capitalist and socialist 
sectors. Nationalization of industry in the socialist 
countries would suggest that private expenditures in the 
socialist countries would produce a smaller ratio than that 
of the capitalist system. The communist goals and institu­
tions should produce the smallest amount of private expen­
ditures in relation to domestic product while the spending 
of the traditionalist system would be almost entirely private.
Price stability can also be studied in the typifica­
tion models. Very stable prices can be expected to emanate 
from the communist system due to the government establishment 
of prices. Because of the goal of price stability in the
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socialist and capitalist countries/ these systems should 
produce relative small amounts of inflation. The free mar­
ket system in these countries, however, would suggest that 
some instability would be present. The lack of a developed 
market in the traditionalist countries would result in a 
high degree of price stability.
Conclusion
Although the typification models do not enable one 
to predict exact measures of performance, the models provide 
a basis for making certain a priori predictions about rela­
tive growth and price stability between the economic systems. 
One would expect the largest growth rate and most stable 
prices from the communist countries and the least from the 
traditional system. The performance of the capitalist and 
socialist systems should be similar with a significant 
difference in the ratio of private expenditures. The fol­





The data and the results of the statistical analysis 
of the hypotheses are presented in this chapter. The first 
section is a presentation of the data used to measure the 
economic performance of growth and inflation. The second 
section is the measurement of the differences of economic 
performance between the countries within the various systems, 
and the third section is a measurement of the differences 
between the systems. Although the statistical results are 
presented in the present chapter, the analysis and the 
derivation of conclusions and inferences are developed in 
the concluding chapter.
Available Data 
The sources of data for the non-communist countries 
provide a degree of comparability. Although the data are 
subject to criticism, the United Nations^ data were considered 
to be the best available data for a study of comparative
^United Nations Statistical Office, Yearbook of 




performance. The criteria for the measurements were estab­
lished by the United Nations, and tlie data should reflect 
the application of common criteria. The price data provided 
by the International Monetary Fund^ should reflect a similar 
attribute.
The communist countries are not included in the 
reports of the United Nations and the International Monetary 
Fund. The use of official publications of the communist 
countries is unacceptable for a comparison of performance 
with non-communist countries for several reasons cited by 
Robert Campbell.̂  These reasons are illustrated by an exami­
nation of the industrial output for the Soviet union.
The first difficulty encountered is one of double- 
çounting of industrial output. "In any year total output of 
industry is figured by first determining the value of output 
of every industrial enterprise and then adding these 
together. The double-counting is obvious in the Soviet 
accounting procedure. "Another influence which exaggerates 
the Soviet measure of growth has been failure to correct 
adequately for changes in the price l ev e l .T h e Soviet
^International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund,
1955-1965).
3Robert W. Campbell, Soviet Economic Power; Its 
Organization, Growth and Challenge (Boston: Houghton Mifflin




Union has relied heavily on the 1926-27 price level to 
establish constant prices. As new products were introduced, 
the prices were created for the 1926-27 period which greatly 
distorted the true present value of output. The final bias 
introduced by the Soviet index is the weighting system on 
which it is based. By using the 1926-27 price level, one 
finds a bias introduced because the "mix" of goods has 
changed. The weighting system produces the third problem 
which makes the Soviet data unacceptable. The studies used 
in providing the communist data have attempted to eliminate 
these difficulties of the communist data.
Indicators of Economic Growth 
The five basic indicators of economic growth used 
for comparison in the study are Gross National Product (GNP), 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross Domestic Capital Forma­
tion (GDCF), National Income (NI), and Private Consumption 
(PC). The growth rates for each of these are calculated 
on a per capita basis. The change is calculated as the ratio 
of the difference of year two minus year one divided by the 
per capita rate for year one. The calculation is shown in 
the example of calculation of GNP where: !■
AGNP = GNP in year one.
BGNP — GNP in year two.
APOP = Population in year one. . 
BPOP = Population in year two.
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BGNP _ AGNP 
Growth Rate = BPOP APOP 
(In per cent) AGNP
APOP
100.0
Tables 6.1-6.5 present the data on these five major growth 
indicators for the non-communist systems. Included in the 
tables are the number of observations available for the 
period from 1950-1968 and the mean growth rate for this 
period. Included, also, is the standard deviation which 
provides a measure of dispersion.
The mean growth rate is computed by taking the 
arithmetic average of the growth rates computed for each 
year. Although this computation may introduce a positive 
bias, the statistical analysis should not be distorted. The 
same bias will be present for all countries since all of the 
data is treated in the same manner. Since a comparison is 
required for the yearly growth rates, the computation was 
necessary. The loss of independence in the error terms 
violates an assumption of the analysis of variance, but the 
validity of the F-test is affected very little by the corre­
lation of the error terms.
In addition to these five primary growth indicators,
1 \ two ratios are used to illustrate the use of the output.
The first is a ratio of Gross Domestic Capital Formation
to Gross Domestic Product. These ratios for the non-
commupist countries are given in Table 6.6. The ratio of
capital formation to product provides some information as
to how much attention is being given to future growth.
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TRADITIONAL 110 1.5276 3.5004
Ceylon
Chile 16 1.4636 3.6268
Colombia 14 1.2926 1.6157
Dominican Rep. 14 0.7730 6.7809
Guatemala 14 1.5588 2.9640
Honduras 17 1.8201 2.8907
Paraguay 14 1.1886 2.5723
Peru 14 2.8024 2.3737
Tunisia 7 1.0087 3.2383
CAPITALIST 64 4.3070 4.1549
Australia
Canada 17 2.1459 3.2936
Germany, Federal
Republic of 16 4.8918 3.2369
Japan 14 8.7557 3.9217
United States 17 2.2541 2.7764
SOCIALIST 43 2.8349 2.0712
Denmark 17 3.0032 2.7466
Norway 14 3.1761 1.4256
Sweden —  —
United Kingdom 12 2.1985 1.5400
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TRADITIONAL 118 1.5275 4.2144
Ceylon 13 1.1376 3.2198
Chile 15 1.6717 3.2925
Colombia 14 1.3524 1.3745
Dominican Rep. 14 0.7921 6.7074
Guatemala 14 1.6006 2.9758
Honduras 17 1.5988 7.1196
Paraguay 14 1.2774 2.6192
Peru 10 3.1397 2.9338
Tunisia . 7 1.6414 3.2224
CAPITALIST 57 2.7703 3.0055
Australia 9 2.4283 2.4501
Canada 17 2.1225 3.1954
Germany, Federal
Republic of 14 4.4233 3.0258
Japan — —
United States 17 2.2377 2.7860
SOCIALIST 63 2.9829 1.9635
Denmark. 17 3.0021 2.7421Norway 14 3.2759 1.4157
Sweden 15 3.4447 1.7294
United Kingdom 17 2.3150 1.5573
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TABLE 6.3
ANNUAL, PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE OF













TRADITIONAL 116 2.9788 15.5557
Ceylon 16 0.5673 8.0438
Chile 15 0.8244 8.5101
Colombia 14 -0.7624 10.5545
Dominican Rep. 14 4.9130 31.7565
Guatemala 14 5.5523 17.1028
Honduras 17 4.4278 13.6698
Paraguay 5 8.3214 14.4376
Peru 14 2.3783 14.0686
Tunisia 7 5.4406 7.7066
CAPITALIST 74 5.3377 7.7785
Australia 9 4.2049 4.2882
Canada 17 2.8387 7.1429
Germany, Federal 
Republic of 17 6.3490 6.4876
Japan 14 12.5147 10.3230
United States 17 1.5149 4.2572
SOCIALIST 63 6.0641 16.7188
Denmark 17 5.8835 7.4932
Norway 14 4.0745 4.3759
Sweden 15 5.6099 3.5933
United Kingdom 17 8.2842 31.4832
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TRADITIONAL 124 4.7001 5.6815
Ceylon 16 3.8828 4.5437
Chile 17 4.1158 5.9636
Colombia 14 5.8878 6.0563
Dominican Rep. 14 4.9347 8.9971
Guatemala 14 4.3729 3.5155
Honduras 16 3.7189 4.2621
Paraguay 13 5.2792 4.9972
Peru 13 7.0656 6.4797
Tuni sia 7 2.5716 5.2158
CAPITALIST 74 6.0279 3.9923
Australia 9 5.0930 3.9026
Canada 17 4.8384 3.4522
Germany, Federal
Republic of 17 6.9832 3.8711




SOCIALIST 48 3.3342 3.3504
Denmark 17 3.6648 4.0236
Norway 14 3.9705 3.8396
Sweden ——
United Kingdom 17 2.4795 1.8867
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TRADITIONAL 125 1.7310 4.5744
Ceylon 16 1.0185 5.0734
Chile 15 2.3431 3.5755
Colombia 14 1.5194 2.7994
Dominican Rep. 14 1.5216 8.3365
Guatemala 14 1.0963 3.0009
Honduras 17 1.7138 2.8654
Paraguay 14 1.5687 4.8457
Peru 14 3.8334 4.0792
Tunisia 7 0.3215 5.1235
CAPITALIST 65 3.9762 3.0567
Australia
Canada 17 2.1678 1.9770
Germany, Federal
Republic of 17 5.0559 3.1550
Japan 14 7.1427 1.5795
United States 17 2.0972 2.0608
SOCIALIST 63 2.5229 2.0409
Denmark 17 2.5881 3.1983
Norway 14 2.6920 1.3225
Sweden 15 2.8753 1.3164
United Kingdom 17 2.0076 1.5954
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TRADITIONAL 114 15.1666 4.4366
Ceylon 15 12.7688 1.7636
Chile 17 12.7085 3.3188
Colombia 14 18.8331 3.7515
Dominican Rep. 14 14.6440 3.7850
Guatemala 14 12.1864 2.0977
Honduras 17 13.8090 2.0782
Paraguay 6 12.7230 2.1714
Peru 10 20.4998 3.1300
Tunisia 7 23.7218 2.1606
CAPITALIST 58 21.6664 3.6774
Australia 9 26.1077 1.3529
Canada 17 22.7335 1.8169
Germany, Federal
Republic of 15 23.3217 1.9282
Japan —  —
United States 17 16.7878 0.7383
SOCIALIST 63 21.3514 5.5570
Denmark 17 19.7111 3.1727
Norway 14 29.4578 1.0659
Sweden 15 22.1861 1.5881
United Kingdom 17 15.5796 3.1715
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Since economic development is a function of capital forma­
tion, this ratio is indicative of economic development within 
the country.
On the other side of the use of a country's output, 
a ratio is established between Private Consumption and Gross 
Domestic Product. This ratio, which is illustrated in 
Table 6.7, provides information regarding the amount of the 
total product which the private sector uses for consumption.
The growth data available for the communist countries 
is fragmented and available only in special reports.
Table 6.8 lists the available indicators of growth in the 
communist countries. The Soviet Data is derived from studies 
of Abraham Becker and Stanley P. Cohn.® The statistics for 
the 'East European countries is derived from a study by 
Maurice Earnst.^
Indicators of Economic Stability
The primary indicators of economic stability used in 
this report are the annual change in the Consumer Price 
Index and the Wholesale Price Index. The computation is
, Abraham S. Becker, Soviet National Income, 1953^1964 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), and
Stanley H. Cohn, "Analysis of the Soviet Growth Model,"
The Soviet Economy, ed. by Morris Bornstein and D. P. Pusfeld 
(3rd ed.; Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970).
^Maurice Earnst in a study for U.S. Congress, Joint 
Economic Committee, New Directions in the Soviet Economy 


















TRADITIONAL 122 75.7679 5.2101
Ceylon 15 75.2659 4.9214
Chile 17 76.0159 4.1205
Colombia 14 73.9534 1.8602
Dominican Rep. 14 71.9184 4.1418
Guatemala 14 81.7517 1.5371
Honduras 17 79.3311 4.0815
Paraguay 14 79.5157 2.3455
Peru 10 68.1331 2.1072
Tunisia 7 70.3765 2.5367
CAPITALIST 49 62.2782 1.5759
Australia
Canada 17 63.0344 1.4210
Germany, Federal
Republic of 15 60.5858 1.0361
Japan —  —
United States 17 63.0155 0.7880
SOCIALIST 63 63.3833 4.6902
Denmark 17 67.6785 1.1081
Norway 14 57.3241 1.6450
Sweden 15 60.0313 2.1288
United Kingdom 17 67.0358 1.1897
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Soviet Union 6.2 4.0 26.3 49.3
Bulgaria 5.9 N.A. 31.0 N.A.
Czechoslovakia 4.0 N.A. 26.2 N.A.
East Germany 5.1 N.A. 19.2 N.A.
Hungary 4.8 N.A. 25.8 N.A.
Poland 4.9 N.A. 24.8 N.A.
Rumania 111 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Average All
Countries 5.2 25.51
Standard Deviation 1.855 8.465
Range 2.2 11.8
simply a ratio of the difference in the index between year 
two and year one to the index for year one. Table 6.9 and 
6.10 provide the data for the non-communist countries. The 
mean growth rates of the price indexes are arithmetic aver­
ages of the annual growth rates. As in the computation of 
the growth rates for the growth indicators, the statistical
I •problems of a positive bias and the loss of independence will 
have very little effect on the F-test used in analysis of 
variance. Because the prices in the communist countries are 
administratively set by the central planning agencies, the 
data is not meaningful in a study of this nature. Since
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TRADITIONAL 123 8.3934 13.5954
Ceylon 17 1.0055 1.5458
Chile 17 32.9786 20.0695
Colombia 14 9.3475 9.0575
Dominican Rep. 14 0.9927 3.9548
Guatemala 14 0.3761 1.4075
Honduras 16 2.5212 3.6574
Paraguay 13 10.4407 8.3419
Peru 13 8.3275 3.4586
Tunisia 5 4.0616 1.5647
CAPITALIST 74 2.4851 2.1732
Australia 9 2.3131 1.3829
Canada 17 2.2569 2.4439
Germany, Federal 
Republic of 17 2.2397 1.9174
Japan 14 3.7791 2.7026
United States 17 1.9842 1.7720
SOCIALIST 62 3.7506 2.2893
Denmark 16 4.1451 3.0785
Norway 14 3.4017 1.6912
Sweden 15 3.4834 1.6801
United Kingdom 17 3.9024 2.4392
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TRADITIONAL 73 11.6163 16.8431
Ceylon
Chile 17 32.8061 21.4167
Colombia 14 11.2231 7.9535
Dominican Rep. 14 1.2995 5.8391
Guatemala 14 0.1456 2.2893
Honduras
Paraguay
Peru 9 9.1879 8.0553
Tunisia 5 6.0486 3.8318
CAPITALIST 65 1.3134 3.5249
Australia
Canada 17 1.4701 3.9358
Germany, Federal
Republic of 17 1.7982 4.4217
Japan 14 0.5220 2.5930
United States 17 1.3237 2.8931
SOCIALIST 56 1.7405 4.2928
Denmark 17 2.6302 6.8179Norway 14 1.8540 1.8785
Sweden 15 1.5750 2.8741
United Kingdom 10 0.3175 2.8671
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the prices of the communist countries are not determined by 
the market system/ a comparison with the other countries 
will not be provided.
Test of Hypothesis I
The first hypothesis tested in the study was stated 
as follows:
The performance of the various national economies 
within the same economic system is not statistically 
different from one another.
The results of the statistical analysis for the first hypo­
thesis are recorded in Tables 6.11 and 6.12. Table 6.11 
is confined to a measurement of the performance differences 
in growth. In the seven indicators chosen for the non­
communist countries/ there was general acceptance of the 
hypothesis for the traditional and socialist systems while . 
the capitalist countries showed a wider variation in perfor­
mance. An exception was the ratios of private consumption 
and investment to gross domestic product which indicated a 
significant difference of performance for all three systems.
Although the analysis of variance could not be used 
for the communist countries/ one finds that both the range 
and dispersion within the system is small. In both the '■ 
measurement of GNP and ratio of investment to GNP all non­
communist countries were within one standard deviation of 
the mean.
Table 6.12 gives the results of the analysis of 
variance on the two measures of economic stability.
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TABLE 6.11
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF 
GROWTH INDICATORS
Degrees of
GROWTH INDICATOR F Freedom Significance
System Ratio Between Within 10% 5% 1%
GROSS NATIONAL 
PRODUCT
Traditional 0.4097 7 102 No No No
Capitalist 13.2592 3 60 Yes Yes Yes
Socialist 0.8050 2 40 No No No
GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT
Traditional 0.2498 8 109 No No No
Capitalist 1.9921 3 53 No No No
Socialist 1.0387 3 59 No No No
GROSS DOMESTIC
CAPITAL FORMATION
Traditional 0.3601 8 107 No No No
Capitalist 5.7532 4 69 Yes Yes Yes














8 115 No No No
4 69 Yes Yes Yes
2 45 No No No
8 116 No No No
3 61 Yes Yes Yes
3 59 No No No
8 105 Yes Yes Yes
3 54 Yes Yes Yes














Traditional 20.8619 8 113 Yes Yes Yes
Capitalist 24.8690 2 46 Yes Yes Yes
Socialist 170.6804 3 59 Yes Yes Yes
TABLE 6.12
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF
PRICE INDICATORS
Degrees of
PRICE INDICATOR P Freedom Significance
System Ratio Between Within 10% 5% r/o
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
Traditional 21.5841 8 114 Yes Yes Yes
Capitalist 1.6370 4 69 No No No
Socialist 0.3482 3 58 No No No
WHOLESALE PRICE
INDEX
Traditional 16.1888 5 67 Yes Yes Yes
Capitalist 0.3428 3 61 No No No
Socialist 0.6071 3 52 No No No
Significant differences were found within the traditional 
economic system with the capitalist and socialist countries 
demonstrating a high degree of homogeneity.
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Test of Hypothesis II
The second hypothesis tested in the study was stated 
as follows:
The economic performances of the different 
systems as indicated by the national economies 
are not statistically different.
The results of the analysis of variance tests used for this 
hypothesis are recorded in Table 6.13. Except for the major 
exception of gross domestic capital formation, the differ­
ences in general cannot be attributed to chance. The results 
indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected.
With regard to the communist countries, the growth 
as measured in gross national product (5.20 per cent annual 
average) appears to be larger than the socialist rate of 
4.3 which is the next highest. The 25.5 per cent of gross 
national product devoted to investment also appears signifi­
cantly larger than the 21.7 per cent of the socialist coun­
tries. The figures may be somewhat misleading because the 
growth rates of the communist countries during the latter 
years have been appreciably lower than in the 1950's. The 
growth of private consumption is the same as that of the 
socialist countries, but the amount of gross national output 
allowed for private consumption is significantly lower.
Conclusion
The significance of the results is explained in the 
final chapter. The purpose of the present chapter was simply
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Product 12.9613 2 214 Yes Yes Yes
Gross Domestic 
Product 4.5991 2 235 Yes Yes No
Gross Domestic
Capital Formation 1.1939 2 250 No No No
National income 4.6286 2 243 Yes Yes Yes
Private Consumption 7.8090 2 250 Yes Yes Yes
Ratio of Investment 
to GDP 55.7424 2 232 Yes Yes Yes
Ratio of Private 
Consumption
to GDP 235.0552 2 231 Yes Yes Yes
PRICE INDICATORS 
Consumers 10.4199 2 258 Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale 19.9933 2 191 Yes Yes Yes
to record the data and the output of the statistical tests 
of analysis of variance. The dearth of data for communist 
countries is evident and the conclusions that can be made 
are thus limited.
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction
The conclusions which can be drawn from a study such 
as this are many and varied. The purpose of the present 
chapter is to present the conclusions which have been drawn 
from the presentation of a methodology of comparative eco­
nomic systems, the examination and comparison of the classi­
cal and modern economic systems, and the results of the 
statistical analysis of the performance indicators of growth 
and inflation. In addition, one finds many areas which are 
in need of further research which is outside the scope of 
this work. The final part of this chapter will be used to 
present some ideas for further research.
Methodology
I In developing a methodology for approaching the \ 
comparison of economic systems, one first delineates between 
pure theory and real world systems. Pure theory alone is 
not sufficient for comparison of existing systems since none 
conform to the ideal models. Pure theory must be comple­
mented by an examination of the essential features of existing
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systems, with the use of both, one can illustrate the 
uniformities and singularities found within each system.
Since economic systems are found couched in a social and 
political framework, the goals of an economy are an essential 
ingredient in the characterization of the economic system 
and must be considered along with, and.in relation to, the 
economic institutions.
The methodology which was constructed in Chapter II 
as a combination of various approaches was centered around 
the use of typification theory elucidated by Max Weber. The 
resulting methodology proved extremely useful in detecting 
the essential economic features in terms of goals and insti­
tutions. In the comparison of the classical model and the 
present system, one may use this methodology to see the 
evolution of the ends and means of the systems. The methods 
work equally well for all of the various systems because 
each has a particular institutional framework and motivating 
force.
Classical vs. Modern Systems
The most evident conclusion that can be drawn from 
the study of the classical and modern economic systems is 
the idealism of the classical.systems. Each system has 
evolved into a workable system, but in doing so, has seemingly 
moved farther and farther away from the concepts outlined in 
the classical writings. The plans of the early writers, 
although logically consistent, have not proved adaptable to
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human experience. Not only have the institutions been 
established in a form different from the classical concep­
tion, but the motivating goals have also changed in character 
and importance.
Although many differences were enumerated in the 
study, some striking similarities were, brought forth. First, 
one sees some similarities between the classical and modern 
systems. Goals, while changing in importance and priority, 
were revealed as a "thread" which runs through the evolu­
tionary process. Because of some external effects and shift­
ing of goals, the institutions have been constantly changing. 
However, one often finds the same basic framework. The 
second similarity evident in the typification of the economic 
systems is the compatibility of the goals and institutions. 
Although not consistently true, one finds that often the 
goals are found as the center of the institutional framework. 
The final area of similarity evolves in the comparison of 
the existing systems. The goals and institutions of one 
system often are exhibited in a totally different system.
The form is often changed but homogeneity is quite frequently 
present.
The comparison of the classical and-modern systems 
provide insight as to the evolutionary processes which are 
acting upon the economic system. Through a proper under­
standing of the evolutionary process one can gain information 
as to future evolution. The prediction of the future must
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make cognizance of not only the institutional framework/ but 
also the goals and ideology which are integral to the system. 
The "convergence thesis" examined in this light appears less 
plausible than when only the institutions are compared.
In the comparision of existing systems# the problem 
of delineating between the socialist and capitalist system 
is highlighted. The socialist goal of public ownership has 
not been implemented. At the same time, the goal of indi­
vidual freedom in capitalism has been supplemented with a 
goal of security for all. The emergence of this goal has 
provided for a continuing growth of the public sector in the 
capitalist economies.
Analysis of the Statistical Results 
The conclusions produced from the statistical com-. 
parison of the growth and inflation indicators are eluci­
dating. It appears that there is a great deal of homo­
geneity in the performance of the national economies within 
the same economic system. The growth indicators demonstrate 
that the homogeneity is particularly pronounced in the tra­
ditional and capitalist systems and to a lesser degree in 
socialism. The ratios of investment and private consumption 
to total output show much heterogeneity in all systems.
The information available for the communist countries also 
tends to support the hypothesis of comparable performance 
within the system.
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The price indicators indicate the problems of infla­
tion in the traditional countries. Although this fact has 
been known, the analysis of this study points to the degree 
of heterogeneity within the traditional system.
The conclusions derived from the statistical com­
parison of the performances of the individual systems do not 
support the second hypothesis. In all of the indicators 
except growth of expenditures on capital investment, a signi­
ficant difference was demonstrated at the 5 per cent level.
In the case of domestic product, the difference was not 
significant at the 1 per cent level. An examination of the 
data shows the capitalist and socialist systems demonstrate 
a similar magnitude of performance. The two ratios of invest­
ment and private consumption to domestic output show the 
largest amount of dissimilarity. By the total analysis, one 
concludes that there is a difference of performance in growth 
and inflation between the various economic systems. However, 
one should not infer a cause and effect relationship from 
the study. Differences in the economic system provide one 
possible factor which could be responsible, but many other 
factors are present which could also help to explain the\ 
differences of performance.
In looking at the communist growth rate, one finds 
strong evidence that the rate of growth is diminishing. If 
one were to take only the decade of the 1950's, the differ­
ence between the communist rate of growth and the capitalist 
or socialist growth rates would be much less significant.
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The a priori analysis is generally supported by the 
statistical results. The per capita, real growth rate of 
the traditional system was very close to zero while the 
highest real growth rate was recorded by the communist 
countries. The growth rates of the capitalist and democratic 
socialist countries were very similar. The capital formation 
of the developed countries indicate a propensity and ability 
of providing for future development, and the traditional 
countries exhibited an inability to save for capital accumu­
lation. The capital formation of the communist countries 
illustrates the goal of heavy industrialization.
The price stability measured also supports the expec­
tations derived from the analysis of the typification models. 
The poorly developed market system of the traditional eco­
nomies exhibited an unstable price system. Although a mod­
erate amount of inflation was found in both the capitalist 
and socialist countries, these countries in general have not 
had problems with price stability.
The typification models served well to predict the 
results of the statistical analysis of the economic perfor­
mance of growth and price stability. Incorporating both 
theory and realism, the models succinctly outline the essen­
tial features of the typical economy. Through the expression 
system, one can effectively analyze the expected performance 
of the various economic systems.
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Recommendations for Further Research
The most obvious extension of this study is a more 
complete analysis of the system as a factor of economic 
growth. Having shown that there is a significant difference 
in the performance of economic systems ̂ one would be inter­
ested in knowing to what extent the system factor is respon­
sible for the difference. Many problems would be encountered 
in isolating the effect of the system. For example, if 
capital accumulation is a major factor of growth, one would 
have to isolate how much of a factor the economic system was 
in capital accumulation to show the indirect effects as well 
as the direct effects of a system.
To offer a more complete analysis of the system's 
effect on growth and inflation, one would need to define the 
systems more explicitly in terms of sub-systems. Instead 
of using four main systems as was done in the present study, 
a further refinement would be made to include many sub­
systems. As was noted earlier, economic systems do not 
necessarily conform to political boundaries. In a study 
using the sub-systems, data within a country might have to 
be split between two sub-systems. An example of the exis­
tence of multiple systems within a country is found in most 
of the traditional countries. In these countries, one would 
have to differentiate between the capitalist like sector and 
the rural sector which is strictly traditional.
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A logical extension of the above study woùld be to 
determine the effect of each sub-system on the economic 
development of a country. One would need to describe com­
pletely each sub-system and-quantitatively measure the 
economic performance. The determination of the inter­
relationships of the sub-systems would be the next phase. 
From this, one could draw some inferences as to the portion 
of total growth each sub-system contributed. In addition 
to being an interesting comparative systems research project, 
some indications of proper development policy could be de­
rived. The problems of research in this area are evident. 
The isolation of the sub-systems, the gathering of the 
necessary data, and the definition of the interrelationships 
would all prove to be tremendous obstacles.
Since many countries do not closely fit the typifi­
cation of any of the modern systems, research could help 
show the differences between the ones which do follow the 
typification and the ones which do not. In the analysis of 
this problem, one could typify the four systems and also 
typify four corresponding "imperfect forms" of the same four 
systems. These eight systems could be used to demonstrate
I '
differences between the model systems and the "imperfeçt 
form" found in many countries. The above typification would 
provide more points on the continuum of economic systems.
Finally, some logical extensions can be made utiliz­
ing the same methodology of this study. As more data become
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available for the communist countries, the statistical 
analysis should be repeated to give a more complete picture 
of the performance of the communist system in relation to 
the other systems. The problem at the present time is that 
the data is fragmented and not presented in the form of the 
data from the other countries, making it impossible to give 
the communist system a complete treatment in terms of com­
paring economic performance.
Also, if employment data were available for all of 
the countries, this information could be used as an added 
indicator to measure economic stability. Because of the 
problems of measuring employment, the data presently avail­
able is far from complete and would not provide a useful 
comparison either within or between the various economic 
systems. However, employment is an essential element in 
measuring economic stability since one common goal of all 
economic systems is to provide work for the people who want 
it.
Also, using the same methodology, one could drop 
the assumption of commonality of goals and measure achieve­
ment towards the individual goals, both expressed and implied,
I ■
of the different systems. Although the assumption of the 
common goals of inflation and growth appears valid, one 
finds that different emphasis is placed on the goals of the 
economic systems. One could measure the effect and strength 
of the various goals as demonstrated through the performance 
measurements established for the goals.
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The empirical measurement and comparison of economic 
systems is difficult at best. Assumptions must be made and 
questionable data must be utilized. Even with the problems 
one faces in measuring performance and making comparisons, 
the author feels that it is worthwhile to make such an 
atten^t. Although the study has not produced conclusive 
results, meaningful inferences can be made. The study also 
provides insight into the problem of quantitatively compar­
ing systems and some directions that can be pursued to fur­
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